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I. INTRODUCTION
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,1 the Supreme Court synthesized twenty-five
years of establishment clause analysis into the now well-known three-
prong test. To escape constitutional invalidation, governmental action
challenged under the establishment clause must have: 1) "a secular legis-
lative purpose;" 2 2) "a principal or primary effect which neither inhibits
nor advances religion;" 3 and 3) it "must not foster 'an excessive entangle-
ment with religion.' "' Many commentators have suggested that the first
prong of the Lemon test-the requirement of secular purpose-dictates
judicial inquiry into governmental motives.5 Others, however, argue that
the secular purpose prong only requires a cursory review of government
purpose, not unlike deferential "rational basis" review under the due pro-
cess and equal protection clauses.6 In this view, establishment clause val-
ues are primarily (and adequately) protected by the requirements of pri-
mary secular effect and non-entanglement.7
Beyond the three-prong Lemon test, the Court has articulated little in
the way of a reasoned and consistent theory of the establishment clause.8
The Court's adherence to factual, case-by-case review under the clause
has led to inconsistent holdings and numerous, confusing separate opin-
ions that attempt to define precisely what governmental action the clause
1. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
2. Id. at 612.
3. Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
4. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
5. E.g., Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95, 100; Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theo-
ries of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 162 (1977); Ely, Legislative and Admin-
istrative Motive in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1322-24 (1970); Gardner, Illicit Legisla-
tive Motive as a Sufficient Condition for Unconstitutionality Under the Establishment Clause-A
Case for Consideration: The Utah Firing Squad, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 435, 463-65; Note, The Estab-
lishment Clause and Religious Influences on Legislation, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 944, 964-67 (1980); see
also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636 n.9 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
6. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613
(1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 468-69 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 310 (1952); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 836 & n.7 (1978);
see also Ely, supra note 5, at 1224-27 (motive inquiry only required when legislation cannot be
justified in secular terms); Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative
Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1178-81 (1974) (purpose inquiry subsumed within effects
prong of Lemon test).
7. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 836 & n.7; see Note, A Workable Definition of the Establishment
Clause: Allen v. Morton Raises New Questions, 62 Gao. L.J. 1461, 1462 n.8 (1974); cf. Note, supra
note 6, at 1178-81 (purpose inquiry subsumed within effects prong of Lemon test).
8. But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (historical analysis); Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982) (strict scrutiny).
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prohibits.9 Yet, the pervasive reach of government at all levels, the grow-
ing influence of religious lobbying groups, and the persistent debate over
religion in public schools foreshadow continued Court involvement in fix-
ing the boundary between church and state. This Article explores the use
of a meaningful secular purpose test-through more careful scrutiny of
governmental purposes and motivations-within the framework of the
Lemon test as a means of clarifying existing case law and better protect-
ing the underlying values of the establishment clause.
II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VALUES
In the first modern establishment clause case, Everson v. Board of Ed-
ucation,10 the Court interpreted the establishment clause to:
mean [] at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence anyone to go or to remain away from church against his will
or force him to profess belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing attendance or non-at-
tendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect a "wall of separation" be-
tween Church and State.1
This language reflects the two values that are generally thought to be
protected by the establishment clause: voluntarism and separatism."
9. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT.
L. REV. 673 (1980); Dunsford, Prayer in the Well: Some Heretical Reflections on the Establishment
Syndrome, .1984 UTAH L. REV. 1, 16; e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1971) (six separate
opinions in addition to the opinion for the Court); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (four
separate opinions); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (four separate opinions); see Grand
Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3232 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1983); id. at 408-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Committee for Pub. Educ.
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
10. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
11. Id. at 15-16 (dicta) (citations omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878)).
12. E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 818; Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1680, 1684-86 (1969); Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment-Part 11: The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 516-18 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Gianella I1]; see, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947); id. at 51, 52
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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A. Voluntarism
Voluntarism is the idea that private religious ordering should not be
distorted by government support or influence 3-- in other words, the social
acceptance and popularity of religious organizations and individuals
should depend only on the intrinsic merits of the beliefs and practices that
they advocate. Thus, the Everson Court stressed that government must be
strictly neutral in dealing with religion. 4 The establishment clause vice of
departure from governmental neutrality is that it results in religious be-
liefs and practices receiving a greater or lesser measure of acceptance and
popularity than they would otherwise receive.' 5 Accordingly, some com-
mentators have characterized governmental neutrality as the policy that
preserves voluntarism.' 6
The Court's opinions since Everson have reiterated that the social ac-
ceptance accorded religious beliefs and practices must flow from individ-
ual choice and not from governmental coercion or influence. The Court
has invalidated the inclusion of sectarian instruction and materials, as
well as prayer exercises, in public schools because these programs entail
use of the government's influence and coercive power to promote religious
belief. 17 Voluntarism also explains the sharp distinction that the Court
has drawn between governmental aid to elementary and secondary paro-
chial schools and aid to church-sponsored colleges and universities. Pro-
grams of the former variety are very carefully scrutinized for religious
effects and entanglements, whereas those of the latter variety are ac-
corded substantially greater deference.'" The Court has determined that
13. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 818-19; Freund, supra note 12, at 1684-85; Gianella II, supra note
12, at 516-18; see, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-80, 783-85 (1973);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
14. 330 U.S. at 15; accord Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
15. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 245; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 & n.10 (1981).
16. E.g., Note, Government Neutrality and Separation of Church and State: Tuition Tax Cred-
its, 92 HARV. L. REv. 696, 698 (1979); see Note, supra note 6, at 1175 & n.4.
17. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (posting of Ten Commandments); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963) (prayer and bible reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 429-31 (1962) (prayer); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948) (release-
time religious instruction program on public school campus); see also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488, 490 (1961) (invalidation of affirmation of belief in God as test for holding public office). But see
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (upholding release-time religious instruction pro-
gram off public school campus).
18. Compare Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) and Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) with Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Roemer v. Maryland Bd.
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) and Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE REVIEW
parochial primary and secondary schools impart a religiously skewed edu-
cation to their students. These students, in turn, are easily swayed by
what is taught to them because of their relative lack of education, matur-
ity, and experience. In contrast, the education offered by most church-
sponsored institutions of higher education is essentially secular. In any
event, students at these institutions presumably possess sufficient intellec-
tual and emotional maturity to make independent and critical judgments
about what they are taught.2 0
Although the establishment clause neutrality envisioned by the framers
may have embodied a strict prohibition of any aid to religion,2" this prin-
ciple could remain consistent with voluntarism only so long as the clause
was applied to a central government whose role in shaping American life
remained relatively minor.12 The rise of the welfare state and the applica-
tion of the establishment clause to the states2 s brought contradictions be-
tween governmental neutrality and a strict rule of no aid to religion.
Under a no-aid rule, the benefits of governmental programs designed af-
firmatively to alleviate societal problems must be denied to religion, yet to
deny such benefits to an individual or organization solely on the basis of
religious affiliation is not religiously neutral and undercuts voluntarism.2 4
Accordingly, the modern establishment clause cases have rejected a
strict no-aid rule,2 5 and the Court has made clear that not all governmen-
tal action that aids religion is unconstitutional. For example, the Court
19. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686
(1971) (plurality opinion) (citing Gianella'II, supra note 12, at 586).
20. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 & n.14 (1981); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
686-87 & n.3 (1971) (plurality opinion) (citing Gianella II, supra note 12, at 583); see also Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
21. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947); id. at 37-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting);
Gianella II, supra note 12, at 513-14. However, others have argued persuasively that the clause was
never meant to sweep so broadly. E.g., Wallace v. Jaifree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2508-09 (1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 314 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1984); M. MALBIN. RELIGION AND
POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 13-17 (1978); Corwin, The
Supreme Court as a National School Board, 14 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1949); see Johnson,
Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 817 &
n.2 (1984).
22. See Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development-Part I: The
Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1382-83 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Gianella
1]. See generally P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 145-46 (1982).
23. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
24. Gianella II, supra note 12, at 514 & n.5.
25. Contrary dicta exist. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 217 (1963)
(establishment clause forbids "every form of public aid or support for religion") (quoting Everson,
330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11, 15 (1947)
("government [is] stripped of all power ... to support or otherwise to assist any or all religions"; no
State "can pass laws which aid one religion [or] all religions").
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has upheld governmental reimbursement to the parents of both public and
parochial school students for the cost of their children's travel to and from
school on municipal buses. e It has also upheld the free provision of text-
bookS2 7 and diagnostic and therapeutic services28 to parochial as well as
public school students, the reimbursement of parochial schools by the
state for expenses incurred in administering and scoring state-mandated
tests 29 and a narrowly drawn tax deduction for certain public and private
school expenses.80 In each of these cases, the Court reasoned that ex-
tending the benefits of nonreligious social welfare programs to religious
individuals and organizations did not violate the neutrality principle so
long as the aid was given in a context that did not imply government
endorsement or preference of religion.3' In other words, as long as govern-
ment aids religion incidentally as part of a larger secular program, estab-
lishment clause neutrality is preserved. Similarly, the Court has refused
to strike down "release-time" programs pursuant to which off-campus sec-
tarian religious instruction is made available to public school students
during school hours, so long as the coercive power of the government is
not used to compel attendance at the classes.82 When governmental influ-
ence or coercive power is not exercised disproportionately to support reli-
gious functions, 3 governmental action allowing participation in religious
functions does not violate the neutrality principle, even when the action is
not mandated by the free exercise clause.3"
26. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
27. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Me~k v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
28. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 242-48 (1977).
29. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977).
30. See Meuller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
31. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359-61 (opinion of Stewart, J.,); id. at 394-95 (opinion of
Rehnquist, J.) (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 814-15 (1973) (White,
J., dissenting)); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1947); see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 242 (1977) (quoting Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-617 (1971)). But see Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 102
Wash. 2d 624, 628-29, 689 P.2d 53, 56 (1984) (5-2 decision) (holding establishment clause prohibits
aid under state vocational rehabilitation program to handicapped student studying for the ministry at
sectarian college), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1863 (1985).
32. Compare McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) with Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952).
33. For example, a law mandating that employees or school children be excused from work or
school on religious holidays when not unreasonably disruptive or otherwise impracticable, or that non-
Sunday Sabbatarians be exempted from compliance with Sunday closing laws.
34. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311, 313-14 (1952); see also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459
U.S. 116, 123, 126 (1982). The Court generally has held that exemptions for religious groups or
individuals designed to ease the burden of generally applicable legislation do not violate the establish-
ment clause. E.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
[ARIZ. ST. UJ.
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The common element in these cases is the government's ability to ex-
plain in credible, nonreligious terms the law that grants the religious aid.
Thus, although the holdings ultimately aid religion in an absolute sense
by reducing the economic and social cost to adherents and organizations
of particular religious beliefs and practices, the aid is nevertheless consti-
tutional because it merely puts the adherents and organizations on an
equal footing with nonreligious persons and groups in qualifying for gov-
ernmental largesse.3
The Sunday Closing Law Cases 6 effected two significant variations on
the modern rejection of the strict no-aid principle. First, these cases estab-
lished that the rationale underlying the rejection of the strict no-aid prin-
ciple also applies to governmentally imposed burdens on religion that nev-
ertheless do not amount to violations of the free exercise clause. In other
words, the cases rejected a strict "no-burden" rule that is analogous to
strict no-aid. Despite the burdens that Sunday closing laws impose on
Sabbatarians and other non-Sunday worshippers, the Court has upheld
the laws because it is persuaded that they are justifiable by reference to
purely secular governmental goals and that these goals cannot be imple-
mented in any less intrusive manner. 37 The opinions stand for the proposi-
tion that, so long as government is rationally pursuing a legitimate secular
goal in the least intrusive manner, the establishment clause does not spe-
cially insulate religion from the burdensome effects of facially neutral
governmental action.38 Thus, even when governmental action dispropor-
U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1967). Estate of Thornton v. Cal-
der, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985), holding unconstitutional a state statute granting to all individuals
an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath, is not to the contrary. Thornton holds only
that religious individuals do not have an unconditional right to accommodation under the free exercise
clause when such accommodation imposes substantial costs on other members of society. See id. at
2918.
35. Gianella !1, supra note 12, at 517-22; Note, supra note 6, at 1176 n.7; see e.g., Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1967));
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
36. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v.,
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
37. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442-44 (1961). McGowan has been broadly criti-
cized for its studied ignorance of the free exercise burdens implicit in Sunday closing laws. See, e.g.,
Kushner, Toward the Central Meaning of Religious Liberty: Non-Sunday Sabbatarians and the Sun-
day Closing Laws Revisted, 35 Sw. L.J. 557 (1981); infra note 101.
38. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961); P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1961) (arguing that Court's religion clause
decisions generally support proposition that clauses prohibit government use of a religious standard or
classification as the basis for action or inaction). However, facially neutral governmental action never-
theless may be unconstitutional under the free exercise clause as applied to particular individuals or
groups. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 405 U.S.
1985:6771
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tionately burdens religion, as compared to the burden the action imposes
on non-religion, the action may still be constitutional if the government
can justify the action by reference to believable secular goals-i.e., when
the government can show that the disproportionate effect was not
intended.
Second, the Sunday Closing Law Cases teach that the government may
take majoritarian religious preferences into account in formulating ways
to implement legitimate governmental goals." The Court found that the
legislature might reasonably have determined that Sunday is the day that
most citizens would choose for a weekly holiday and, therefore, that the
legislative goals of the closing laws are most effectively implemented by a
Sunday holiday.40 Although the closing laws obviously favor Christian re-
ligions by designating Sunday as the weekly holiday, they do not for that
reason violate the establishment clause.
The Court significantly broadened this principal when it upheld against
establishment clause challenge a city's inclusion of a nativity scene as part
of a larger secular Christmas holiday display.4I The Court observed that
Christmas is a holiday long celebrated both religiously and secularly by
the majority of the Western world and that by depicting the religious
origins of the holiday, the city is merely participating in celebration of the
holiday in accordance with the traditional symbols and customs of the
majority of its citizens.4 Thus, although the nativity scene obviously coin-
cides with the Christian celebration of Christmas, the city's acknowledg-
ment of majoritarian religious preferences by inclusion of the display does
not for that reason violate the establishment clause.43
The cases suggest a general establishment clause limitation on neutral-
ity and voluntarism. Facially neutral governmental action that aids or
burdens religion, even disproportionately, does not violate the neutrality
principle when the government can articulate a credible non-religious jus-
tification for the action.
B. Separatism
Although voluntarism is thought to be the more fundamental establish-
ment clause value, the Court also has read the establishment clause to
205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1967).
39. Profesor Gianella called this the "secularly relevant religious factor." Gianella II, supra note
12, at 527-28.
40. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1961).
41. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
42. Id. at 1362-63.
43. Id. at 1364, 1366.
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protect a separatism value. Separatism is the idea that social and individ-
ual benefits from both religion and government are maximized when the
two are institutionally separated."'
Although strong separatism language appeared in some of the Court's
early establishment clause opinions,"' the Court did not clearly define the
contours of the value until the emergence of the concept of church-state
"6entanglement" in Walz v. Tax Commission."" In Walz, the Court held
that a state property tax exemption for church-owned property did not
violate the establishment clause. Significantly, the Court refused to rest
its holding on the fact that churches, like other charitable, nonprofit orga-
nizations, generally provide welfare, counselling and other socially desira-
ble services:
To give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the work of religious
bodies would introduce an element of government evaluation and
standards as to the worth of particular social welfare programs, thus
producing a kind of continuing, day-to-day relationship which the pol-
icy of neutrality seeks to minimize."7
In other words, continual governmental evaluation of the relative social
merits of particular religious programs, even when undertaken only to as-
certain eligibility for a tax exemption, suggests the very regulatory scru-
tiny of religion that the establishment clause prohibits. Instead, the Court
upheld the tax exemption because it eliminates potential church-state con-
flicts without creating other entangling church-state relationships."8
Similar concerns are evident in the school aid cases that have domi-
nated establishment clause jurisprudence. When the Court invalidates
governmental aid to religious schools on entanglement grounds, it gener-
ally refers to one of two considerations: (1) whether the governmental
controls necessary to ensure that the aid is used only for secular purposes
would too closely involve government in the operation of religious
schools, 9 and (2) whether the disbursement of aid would divide political
or regulatory bodies along sectarian or religious-nonreligious lines. 50
44. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1982); McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948); L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 819.
45. See supra note 25.
46. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
47. Id. at 674.
48. See id. at 674, 676.
49. E.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3237 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254
(1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-21
(1971).
50. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 794-98 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971). The element of religious-
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Commentators fear that governmental regulation to ensure that aid to
parochial schools is used only for secular purposes might cause religious
schools to compromise their religious beliefs or practices in order to qual-
ify or remain eligible for the aid.51 Additionally, in any close regulatory
relationship, those who are subject to regulation have historically engaged
in intense efforts to influence and control the governmental regulators.
When the regulatory relationship is one between church and state, suc-
cessful lobbying efforts can be described as religious control of a govern-
mental agency.5 2 Moreover, political division along sectarian lines under-
mines the legislative process by injecting into it factors-such as religious
affiliation and belief-that do not lend themselves to the essential legisla-
tive processes of fact-finding and compromise." Sectarian strife also di-
verts scarce legislative and administrative resources from resolution of
more compelling secular issues.5 4
Accordingly, the separation of government and religion (or "non-entan-
glement") eliminates two dangers inherent in close relationships between
government and religion-that allowing government to oversee the affairs
of religious organizations might permit it directly or indirectly to influ-
ence the religious beliefs and practices of such groups, and that the com-
munity might be polarized and the political system rendered ineffective by
sectarianism in government.
A tension exists between voluntarism and separatism. To the extent
that separatism guards against the danger of government control of reli-
gion, it is consistent with voluntarism. When separatism is viewed in
terms of insulating government from religion, however, it often conflicts
with voluntarism.55 Stretched to its logical limits, separatism would pre-
vent aid of any sort from flowing to religion from government-i.e., the
secular governmental conflict has been invoked only in dicta, and questions persist about its continued
vitality. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 830; infra note 135. Compare Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 253-54 (1982) with Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1364-65 (1984) and Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980). See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1367 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
The Court recently has read the establishment clause to prohibit the apparent state endorsement of
religion inherent in aid to parochial schools. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216,
3226 (1985) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)).
51. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1971); id. at 650-52 & nn.8-9 (opinion of Bren-
nan, J.); Freund, supra note 12, at 1685; Note, supra note 6, at 1187-89.
52. See Freund, supra note 12, at 1685-86.
53. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 253-54 (1982) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n. 397 U.S.
664, 695 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.)); see generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1962)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
54. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971).
55. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
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strict no-aid rule5 6 -as well as prevent religious people and organizations
from participating in the political process in any way.5" Religious neutral-
ity would be violated in either event.58
III. SECULAR PURPOSE IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE REVIEW
Scrutiny of the purposes of challenged governmental action has long
been a part of constitutional adjudication." The Court has often applied
this scrutiny by objectively examining the effectiveness with which the
challenged action implements the goals offered by the government in jus-
tification of the action. More recently, the Court also has focused on evi-
dence of the subjective motivations of governmental decision-makers in
taking the challenged action. Both styles of analysis are useful in assess-
ing the constitutionality of governmental action under the establishment
clause.
A. Motivation and Rationality in Constitutional Law
In the wake of two cases in which the Supreme Court expressly de-
clined to invalidate governmental action on grounds of improper motive, 60
several commentators addressed the question whether judicial scrutiny of
the motives of governmental actors is a legitimate and helpful means of
assessing the constitutionality of certain kinds of governmental action.6
Although there is still broad disagreement on the constitutional role that
motive analysis should play (if any), many commentators have concluded
that in some instances, judicial scrutiny of motive is both legitimate and
necessary.6 Indeed, the Court itself has retreated somewhat from its ini-
tial position that analysis of governmental motives is inappropriate and
has held that in certain circumstances proof of illicit constitutional moti-
vations on the part of a governmental actor is essential to show a constitu-
56. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
57. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 819; Freund, supra note 12, at 1686; Note, Toward a Constitu-
tional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1058 (1978).
58. See supra text accompanying note 24. See generally McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 629 (1978).
59. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392 (1798); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 373-74 (1886).
60. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
383 (1968).
61. Brest, supra note 5; Eisenberg, supra note 5; Ely, supra note 5.
62. See, e.g., Alexander, Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 925, 933
(1978); Brest, supra note 5, at 116, 130; Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 136-37, 139-46, 149-51; Ely,
supra note 5, at 1207-08, 1228-49, 1261-63, 1269, 1272-75, 1281-83; Simon, Racially Prejudiced
Governmental Actions: A Motivational Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimina-
tion, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041 (1978); Note, Legislative Purpose. Rationality and Equal Protec-
tion, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 141-42 (1972).
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tional violation." The result has been to focus significant attention on leg-
islative purposes in constitutional litigation under the equal protection
clause, the establishment clause, and other constitutional provisions.6"
Commentators also have focused on the legitimacy and utility of a
meaningful rationality standard to measure the constitutionality of all
government action." Analyzing whether a statute satisfies a minimum
standard of rationality necessarily involves an inquiry into governmental
goals for taking the action and, hence, inquiry into governmental purpose.
In practice, however, the Court's examination of legislative rationality has
rarely resulted in meaningful review of legislative purpose.
The normal formulation of the rationality standard is meaningless with-
out importing into it one or more independent norms against which legis-
lative conduct can be evaluated. 66 Presumably, governmental decision-
makers do not act randomly. It follows that any governmental action, by
63. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court held that evidence of the dispropor-
tionate impact of governmental action on racial minorities was by itself insufficient to make out a
violation of the equal protection clause in the absence of evidence of intentional discrimination by the
government. Id. at 239-42; see also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Subsequent
equal protection cases have elaborated the role of motive analysis in proving such discrimination,
stating that evidence of illicit discriminatory motives may come from historical background, the se-
quence of events leading to the challenged action, legislative or administrative history, and the inabil-
ity of the government to articulate credible, constitutionally permissible legislative goals for the ac-
tion. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275, 279 nn. 24-25 (1979); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metro Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 267 (1978). The Court has also held that
evidence of illicit motive does not dispose of the constitutional question, but only shifts the burden to
the government to prove that such motive did not play a significant role in the decisionmaking pro-
cess. See Mount Healthy School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1978); see also Village of Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21 (dictum). For development of an evidentiary model of violations of the
equal protection clause based on illicit racial motivations, see Simon, supra note 62.
64. Evidence of illicit motivation has played an important role in decisions under the commerce
clause, Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 685-86 (1982) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); the establishment clause, Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2490-91 &
nn.43-44 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968);
the first amendment, Island Trees School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opin-
ion); the due process clause, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (by implication); and the
fifteenth amendment, City of Mobile v. Boklen, 446 U.S. 550 (1980).
65. E.g., Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1980); Bennett,
"Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L.
REV. 1049 (1979); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972);
Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong With Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 487 (1979); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). The Court itself
commonly refers to a rationality test as the minimum standard of review by which the constitutional-
ity of legislation must be measured under the equal protection clause, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v.
Borras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), and the due process clause, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483 (1955).'
66. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 991; Bennett, supra note 60, at 1065-67; Bice, supra note 65, at 9,
17, 31; see Michelman, supra note 65, at 501.
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reason of its existence, will suggest the reasons of the decision-makers for
having taken the action and, therefore, will be "rational. 67 The stigma of
substantive due process inherited from the judiciary of the early twentieth
century apparently has deterred modern courts from attempting to dis-
cern objective standards for governmental decision-making and thereby
give meaning to the rationality standard. 8 Thus, unless the governmental
action under review is characterized as discriminating against a protected
group or burdening the exercise of a preferred right, the Court's use of
the rational basis standard of review signals the constitutionality of the
action under review. 69
Numerous commentators have argued that judicial review of legislative
rationality is meaningful only if the actions of governmental decision-
makers are judged against a standard of social efficiency. This standard
requires that decision-makers act to advance some notion of "the public
interest. '70 Under this analysis, all governmental action generally should
advance some interest of the entire citizenry. The presumption that the
articulated public interest goals are the actual goals of the action is weak-
ened to the extent that governmental action inefficiently implements the
goals articulated by the government in justification of its action and con-
currently imposes burdens on particular groups of citizens or on the exer-
cise of particular constitutional rights.71 At a certain point, the disparity
between the articulated goals and the efficiency of the action in imple-
menting these goals, together with burdens imposed by the inefficiency on
particular groups of citizens or the exercise of certain constitutional
rights, becomes so great that the articulated goals must be rejected as an
explanation for the government's behavior. In other words, the challenged
action is an irrational means of implementing the articulated goals and,
therefore, is unconstitutional. 2
67. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 995; Bennett, supra note 65, at 1056-57, 1059, 1077-78; Bice,
supra note 65, at 8, 30; Gunther, supra note 65, at 35-36; Note, supra note 62, at 128-32, 140-41;
e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 & n.48 (1985).
68. See P. BOBITT, supra note 22, at 149-50; Gunther, supra note 65, at 21.
69. See Bennett, supra note 65, at 1054. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 996.
70. E.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 31-32 (1980); L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 995; Ben-
nett, supra note 60, at 1066-67, 1095; Bice, supra note 65, at 17-19; Gunther, supra note 65, at 8, 21;
Note, supra note 5, at 950; see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 773-74 (1977); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). But see, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 409 (2d ed. 1977)
(general legislative norm is redistribution of wealth to politically effective interest groups); see also J.
ELY, supra, at 130 n.* ("What is hard to sell in America today is the claim that legislators ever vote
in the public interest").
71. See Gunther, supra note 65, at 20.
72. Bennett, supra note 65, at 1062-63; Bice, supra note 65, at 33-39; see Gunther, supra note
65, at 21; Michelman, supra note 65, at 490-92, 500-01.
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A more refined and specialized use of rationality analysis is relevant
when the challenged action accomplishes the government's articulated
goal to a significant degree while burdening a particular class of citizens
or the exercise of certain constitutional rights, but another means would
accomplish the goal with the same or a higher degree of efficiency while
imposing less of a burden on the class or right-so-called "less-intrusive"
or "less-restrictive alternatives. '"Is When two or more methods are equally
effective, failure to implement the goal by means of the less intrusive al-
ternative is irrational. 4 When particularly important constitutional rights
are implicated, the Court has sometimes held that a less intrusive means
of accomplishing a governmental objective is constitutionally required
even though the means may be somewhat less efficient in accomplishing
the objective.75
Meaningful rationality analysis often can provide circumstantial evi-
dence of illegitimate governmental motivation when direct evidence is
lacking. The failure of the government to act in a manner that is more
carefully circumscribed to implement its goals counts as evidence that the
articulated goals were not the 'actual goals of the government-i.e., that
the government instead harbored constitutionally impermissible goals
that, because of their unconstitutionality, the government could not use to
justify passing the legislation.78
Both motive and rationality review reflect the idea that contemporary
constitutional review is a process of justification." Once a challenge to
governmental action passes certain threshold tests, judicial review focuses
on reasons why the government may have taken the challenged action.8
Thus, an integral part of the adjudication of a challenged governmental
action is judicial scrutiny of the purposes articulated by the government
in justification of the action. This scrutiny ensures that the government
does not pursue constitutionally impermissible goals.79
B. Motivation and Rationality in Establishment Clause Review
Under the establishment clause, the religiously disproportionate im-
73. Bice, supra note 65, at 37-38; e.g., J. ELY, supra note 70, at 106 (freedom of speech).
74. Bice, supra note 65, at 37-38; Simon, supra note 62, at 1129; see also Eisenberg, supra note
5, at 149.
75. Bice, supra note 65, at 38-39.
76. Alexander, supra note 62, at 941 & nn. 56-58; Bice, supra note 65, at 24-26; Simon, supra
note 62, at 1121; see Gunther, supra note 65, at 45-47.
77. Bice, supra note 65, at 5; Simon, supra note 62, at 1042.
78. See Bice, Standards of Judicial Review under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses, 50 S. CALIF. L. REv. 689, 690 (1977); Simon, supra note 62, at 1042-43.
79. See Bice, supra note 65, at 24-26.
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pact* of governmental action can, by itself, be a sufficient basis for de-
claring the action unconstitutional." Accordingly, the Court has tended
to focus primarily on the potential religious effects and entanglements of
challenged governmental action while only superficially analyzing govern-
mental purpose.82 Nevertheless, elements of motive and rationality analy-
sis are evident in a number of the Court's establishment clause opinions,
and a justification model of establishment clause review that protects the
establishment clause values of voluntarism and separatism can be fairly
articulated. When governmental action appears religiously biased, the
secular purpose prong of the Lemon test requires an initial explanation of
the action in terms other than a desire disproportionately to help or to
hinder the beliefs or practices of a particular religious sect or religion
generally. 83 Evidence bearing on the plausibility (or lack thereof) of the
explanation serves to shift the burden of proof between plaintiff and gov-
ernment .8  Similarly, when the government acts in concert with religious
people or organizations, the secular purpose prong requires an explanation
in terms other than a desire to facilitate secular regulation of religion or
sectarian control of government. In either case, a justification model of
the secular purpose prong mandates judicial inquiry into the motives of
80. See infra note 83.
81. Compare accompanying text with supra note 63.
82. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069-70 (1983); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 326 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736, 754 (1976); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773-74
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1971).
83. Ely, supra note 5, at 1313-14; see Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct., 1355, 1368 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The proper inquiry [under the secular purpose prong] is whether gov-
ernment intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion"); infra note 145.
The concepts of "religious neutrality" and "disproportionate religious impact" presuppose a base-
line measure of constitutional rights to which religious organizations and individuals are clearly enti-
tled. Government action that materially deviates from this baseline in either direction-by burdening
the exercise of such rights or by granting additional privileges-is religiously non-neutral and thereby
has an unconstitutional, disproportionate religious impact under the establishment clause. However,
the factual and doctrinal inconsistency of the Court's establishment clause opinions, see supra text
accompanying notes 8-9, and the diverse opinions of the commentators attest that no consensus on the
content of a baseline religious rights entitlement is imminent. The issue is further complicated by the
free exercise clause, which sometimes demands government action to alleviate burdens on the exercise
of religious rights when the establishment clause apparently prohibits such action. The exposition of a
general theory of the religious rights granted by the constitution is beyond the scope of this Article.
Accordingly, the arguments developed in this Article generally assume that one can arrive at the set
of baseline religious rights in some principled manner, but generally identify the substance of such
rights only to the limited extent that one can derive their content from the current muddle of estab-
lishment clause decisions. See generally supra text accompanying notes 10-58. For a fuller and more
detailed discussion of the foregoing issues, see Johnson, supra note 21; Ripple, The Entanglement
Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1195 (1980).
84. Ely, supra note 5, at 1316-17.
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governmental decision-makers.
1. McGowan v. Maryland-Illustrating a Justification Model of the
Establishment Clause
McGowan v. Maryland,85 one of the Sunday Closing Law Cases, pro-
vides an excellent example of how the Court could apply a justification
model of the establishment clause. McGowan shows both the analytical
potential of rigorously scrutinizing governmental purpose under the estab-
lishment clause and the negative analytical consequences of failing to do
SO.
In McGowan, the state's comprehensive system of Sunday closing laws
was challenged in part on the ground that it constituted an establishment
of religion. Opponents of the laws argued that they aided the religious
efforts of Christian churches to hold Sunday worship services for their
congregations. Conceding that Sunday closing laws clearly are of religious
origin and that they provide at least coincidental support to churches
seeking to increase attendance at Sunday services, the Court's close scru-
tiny of the Maryland statute nevertheless enabled it to conclude that "the
statute's present purpose and effect is not to aid religion, but to set aside a
day of rest and recreation."86
In upholding the statute, the Court relied heavily on a long and exhaus-
tive review of the religion clauses, Sunday closing legislation generally,
and the Maryland laws in particular.87 The Court noted that the earliest
closing laws in England and colonial America were undeniably religious
in both origin and purpose. Beginning in the nineteenth century, however,
closing laws increasingly were justified by a purely secular pur-
pose-promotion of better physical and emotional health by provision of a
weekly day of rest and relaxation. Maryland's closing laws and their ante-
cedents were consistent with this pattern. The Court also observed that,
during the enactment process, the disputed statute had drawn support
from labor unions and trade associations as well as Christian churches.
Turning to the text of the statute, the Court found expressions such as
"Sabbath-breaking" and "profaning the Lord's day." The statute also
prohibited a number of activities generally considered antagonistic to reli-
gious worship, such as drinking and gambling, at hours when worship ser-
vices were commonly held, and prohibited certain noisy activities from
taking place within 100 yards of a church. Nevertheless, the statute also
85. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
86. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
87. See id. at 431-49 (majority opinion); id. at 459-543 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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permitted a number of activities, such as bingo, and fishing and swim-
ming in public parks, that are inconsistent with church-going and the be-
lief that Sunday is "the Lord's day." Finally, the Court could think of no
alternative that would as effectively implement the state's secular pur-
pose. The Court characterized Sunday as a rational legislative choice for
a common day of rest because the Court perceived it as the day that most
people would choose of their own accord. To choose another day, there-
fore, or to allow people individually to choose their own day, would be
administratively inefficient. The Court concluded that the originally reli-
gious influences and purposes arguably reflected in the language of the
statute had attenuated to a point of insignificance, and that the legislative
goals of the laws were implemented by the least religiously burdensome
means. Accordingly, it upheld the statute against the establishment clause
challenge.88
Because the state's articulated secular purpose was believable, and ap-
parently was implemented by the least burdensome means,89 one cannot
clearly discern in the closing laws a governmental intent to aid religion.90
Nevertheless, the statute's disproportionate favoring of Sunday worship-
pers and burdening of Sabbatarians, such as Jews and Seventh Day Ad-
ventists, as well as its utilization of religious language and deference to
worship services, suggest that a desire to facilitate Christian worship
might have played some role in the lawmaking process. This inference is
partially controverted by the laws' narrow scope, their permission of activ-
ities inconsistent with Sunday worship, and the state courts' long and con-
sistent pattern of upholding Sunday closing laws (including the disputed
statute) on secular grounds. Still, the question remains to what extent (if
any) impermissible religious considerations motivated the legislature to
pass the Sunday closing laws.
In equal protection review, when illicit considerations are proved to
have been taken into account in the governmental decision-making pro-
cess, but all of the state's articulated innocent goals have not been cir-
cumstantially or otherwise disproved, a causation issue is deemed to have
arisen: whether, in the absence of the illicit considerations, the challenged
action would have been taken anyway. 91 The McGowan Court suggested
its awareness of a causation issue in upholding the Maryland closing
statute:
[T]he "Establishment" Clause does not ban federal or state regulation
88. Id. at 452.
89. But see infra text accompanying notes 94-102.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
91. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 149-50; Simon, supra note 62, at 1067, 1127-29.
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of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or har-
monize with the tenets of some or all religions. In many instances, the
Congress or state legislature conclude that the general welfare of soci-
ety, wholly apart from any religious considerations, demands such
regulation. . . Sunday Closing Laws, like those before us, have be-
come part and parcel of th[e] great governmental concern [for the
public health and welfare] wholly apart from their original purposes
or connotations. 92
The italicized language suggests that the Court may have implicitly
employed a causation scheme similar to that expressly approved in later
constitutional cases.93 Consistent with those pronouncements, the Court
did not treat evidence of impermissable religious motivations for enacting
the closing laws as dispositive of the establishment clause issue. Rather,
this evidence served only to shift the burden of proof to the state to show
that the impermissible motivations did not play a material role in the leg-
islature's decision to enact the law.
McGowan might have been notable as a case in which the state was
successfully able to carry this burden of proof. To characterize the case in
this manner, however, would be reaching too far. Although the Court rec-
ognized the legitimacy of the state's articulated secular purpose and, by
carefully scrutinizing the text, legislative history, and political context of
the Maryland closing laws, determined that this purpose was genuinely
considered by the legislature in passing the laws, this analysis only carried
the Court part way to its result: it provided credible justification for a
system of state-enforced, one-holiday-in-seven closing laws, but did not
explain the state's insistence that the holiday be the same for everyone,
and that it be Sunday.94
With regard to universality, the state offered several justifications:
1. Family togetherness-families can enjoy the day of rest together
only if the rest day is the same for each working family member.
2. Efficient enforcement-it is much more difficult to apprehend vio-
lators of the closing laws when the holiday is different for every-
one; with one common rest day, violators are conspicuous, making
enforcement easier.
3. Community cohesion-one of the values of the day of rest is to
permit friends and relatives to socialize and to create a general air
of rest and relaxation throughout the entire community. These
92. 366 U.S. at 442, 445 (emphasis added).
93. E.g., Island Trees School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 n.22 (1982) (plurality
opinion); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)); see
Simon, supra note 5, at 1325.
94. See Ely, supra note 5, at 1325.
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values are not implemented by a one-day-in-seven plan.9"
With regard to the legislative choice of Sunday as the common rest day,
the state offered as sole justification that Sunday is the day most people
would have chosen anyway.96 None of the goals or justifications was chal-
lenged as beyond the regulatory power of the state.
In reviewing the state's articulated justifications for imposing Sunday
as the universal day of rest, the Court changed its analytic style from
inquiry into whether the articulated goals were actually recognized and
considered by the legislature, and whether the challenged legislation ad-
dressed real problems. The Court instead applied classic deferential ra-
tional-basis scrutiny97 and upheld the choices of universality and Sunday,
speculating that a legislature might reasonably have considered such goals
in enacting the challenged statute and that the statute implemented these
imaginary goals at least to some degree. 98
The McGowan Court, however, neither balanced the interests of the
state against those of the individual nor employed any other sort of alter-
natives test, and its failure to do so resulted in ignorance of probative
evidence of illicit legislative motivation. The goals of family togetherness
would be just as effectively implemented by a voluntary one-day-in-seven
plan. Family members would be free voluntarily to act in concert and rest
on the same day, whatever it might be. The one-day-in-seven plan also is
less intrusive, permitting those who worship on another day to rest on that
day and avoid the choice between undergoing economic hardship or for-
saking religious beliefs or practices. Thus, assuming a legislative standard
of social efficiency, 99 family togetherness cannot count as a justification
for state-compelled Sunday resting; the justification must come from the
other articulated goals. That the majority of the population would choose
Sunday merely begs the question whether patterns of religious choice
have been unconstitutionally distorted under the establishment clause by
state preference of majoritarian religious preferences. That leaves the
goals of better enforcement and community cohesion to be balanced
against the resulting intrusions on religious autonomy and fairness. A
one-day-in-seven plan might not as effectively promote community cohe-
sion, but it does not substantially hinder this promotion either-friends
and neighbors may act together to choose the same day, just as family
members who are about unity may be expected to do so. Moreover, the
95. 366 U.S. at 450-51.
96. Id. at 451-52.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
98. 366 U.S. at 450-52 & n.21.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
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efficient enforcement goal may have been only illusorily achieved by the
McGowan laws-there was no evidence that a violator of these laws
would in fact have been any more conspicuous than the violator of a one-
day-in-seven law. 100 Against this one must balance the substantial intru-
sions on religious choice and fairness. Maryland chose a religiously bur-
densome means to implement relatively unimportant (though admittedly
nontrivial) goals when nearly-as-effective, significantly less burdensome
means were available to implement those goals. This choice should have
directed the Court to find that the state's universal prescription of Sunday
as the day of rest was intended disproportionately to favor Christians in
violation of the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test.101
McGowan illustrates how valuable motive and rationality analysis can
be to an evaluation of the secular purposes of legislation challenged under
the establishment clause. By using circumstantial evidence of legislative
motivation to shift the burden of proof between state and plaintiff, one
can make some sense of laws that at first blush appear to have been en-
acted to aid Christian churches in a quest for higher attendance at Sun-
day School. Indeed, the Court's review of the challenged laws' history is a
convincing demonstration that secular concerns genuinely motivated the
legislature to enact the laws. In a society in which governmental interven-
tion and regulation is pervasive, it is important that governmental actions
not be found constitutionally infirm merely because they are suggested by
or coincident with the beliefs or practices of religious organizations or
individuals. The Court's meaningful scrutiny of legislative purpose of the
McGowan laws provided the government with the opportunity to rebut
100. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 614-15 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 613-14 (1961)
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (citation omitted):
What, then, is the compelling state interest which impels the [state] to impede appel-
lants' freedom of worship? What over-balancing need is so weighty in the constitutional
scale that it justifies this substantial, though indirect, limitation of appellants' freedom?
It is not the desire to stamp out a practice deeply abhorred by society, such as polyg-
amy, as in Reynolds, for the custom of resting one day a week is universally honored, as
the Court has amply shown. Nor is it the State's traditional protection of children, as in
Prince v. Massachusetts, for appellants are reasoning and fully autonomous adults .
. . . It is the mere convenience of having everyone rest on the same day. It is to defend
this interest that the Court holds that a State need not follow the alternative route of
granting an exemption for those who in good faith observe a day of rest other than
Sunday.
See also Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting):
[The state] has passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to choose between his
religious faith and his economic survival. That is a cruel choice. It is a choice which I
think no State can constitutionally demand. For me this is not something that can be
swept under the rug and forgotten in the interest of enforced Sunday togetherness.
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presumptions of religious motivation arising from the coincidence of the
laws with Christian worship practices.
On the other hand, the Court's extreme deference to the legislature in
reviewing the manner in which the state determined to implement its le-
gitimate goals resulted in the imposition of substantial burdens on reli-
gious exercise by those persons whose beliefs require observance of a Sab-
bath other than Sunday. When a fundamental right such as the free
exercise of religion is more than trivially burdened by the state's pursuit
of a legitimate government goal, the Court should at least require the
state to show that the goal is being pursued in the least intrusive manner
and that the goal is relatively important. 102 The Court's failure to use
rationality analysis to expose the relative inefficiency of the closing laws in
obtaining the legislative objectives resulted in an improper resolution of
the competing constitutional interests.
2. Applying a Justification Model of the Establishment Clause
Generally, one can classify the Court's establishment clause cases into
two factual patterns. The cases involve either governmental action that
accommodates or otherwise expressly takes into account religious prac-
tices or beliefs, 103 or governmental action that grants to or prohibits a
religious person or organization access to governmental benefits which
otherwise are generally available to all.' 04 Analysis of governmental pur-
pose adds little to the latter group of cases. Application of the secular
purpose prong of Lemon is rarely dispositive in these contexts because the
broad secular legislative classifications embodied in the laws usually can
be credibly defended in terms of legitimate social welfare or similar regu-
latory goals.10 5 Accordingly, constitutional review in these cases tends to
102. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
103. E.g., Estate of Thornton v. Calder, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.
Ct. 2479 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
104. E.g., Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 54 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1986); Grand
Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 572 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). A few cases might be characterized
as involving both kinds of action. E.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Larkin v. Grendel's
Dean, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
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focus on potential religious effects and entanglements. 106 Application of
motive and rationality analysis to the former group of cases, however,
demonstrates the utility of such analysis in clarifying and protecting es-
tablishment clause values in a broad range of governmental actions. Mo-
tive and rationality analysis have been particularly significant in the
Court's establishment clause decisions relating to public school curricu-
lum choices, the use of religious symbols by government, religious lobbies
and religiously motivated legislators, and public school prayer. In each of
these areas (most of which recently have been before the Court), 107 care-
ful scrutiny of governmental purpose is necessary to illuminate the consti-
tutionally proper resolution of the competing interests.
a. Public School Teaching and Curriculum Decisions
One commentator has argued that:
resort to impact will not always assure the protection of establishment
clause rights. For instance, the decision not to teach particular sub-
jects in public schools and universities is normally within the scope of
a state's police power. But if such an exclusionary decision is designed
to promote a religion . . . the establishment clause requires the stat-
ute's invalidation. If impact alone is examined, the effects of the stat-
ute . . . are consistent with both constitutional and unconstitutional
governmental action.108
In Epperson v. Arkansas,1 0' the Court reviewed an action for a declara-
tory judgment that the state's statutory prohibition against teaching the
Darwinian evolutionary model in the public schools was unconstitutional.
The Court, convinced from the record that "fundamentalist sectarian con-
viction was and is the law's reason for existence," held the prohibition
unconstitutional under the establishment clause."1 In a more recent case,
106. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983).
107. See. e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (statute mandating moment of silence
in public schools); Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (inclusion of nativity scene in publicly
funded Christmas display); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (display of Ten Commandments in
public school classroom); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318-20 (1980) (prohibition of Medicaid
funds for most abortions); Stone v. McCreary, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984) (display of privately
funded nativity scene on publicly owned town square), affid by equally divided Court, Village of
Scarsdale v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)
(legislative prayer); Island Trees School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (prohibition of
school library's use of certain books); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d
Cir. 1984) (high school prayer group), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1167 (1985).
108. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 166-67; accord J. ELY, supra note 70, at 137.
109. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
110. Id. at 107-08. In Epperson, the state did not attempt to articulate any secular purpose for
the teaching ban, and impliedly conceded that the law was the result of the anti-evolutionary religious
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Stone v. Graham,"' the Court declared unconstitutional Kentucky's prac-
tice of posting privately funded displays of the Ten Commandments in
public school classrooms, concluding that the "pre-eminent" purpose for
the displays was indisputably religious."'
The Court's decisions in Epperson and Stone are consistent with the
Court's constitutional analysis of legislative purpose in other contexts. For
example, the Court has indicated that evidence of intentional racial or
other discrimination by the government can be inferred from the discrimi-
natory impact of governmental action when the action cannot plausibly be
explained in non-discriminatory terms. 1 3  Thus, in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,"4 the Court held unconstitutional a bizarre rearrangement of
municipal boundaries which had the effect of excluding from the munici-
pality virtually all blacks who had resided within the city under the old
boundaries. As one commentator explained:
[t]he mere fact that boundaries divide communities of different racial
fervor that swept the Bible Belt in the 1920's at the time of the Scopes trial. See 393 U.S. at 103
n.1 1, 107-08 & nn. 15-18 (citing Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927)). Darwinian
evolutionary theory is contrary to the fundamentalist Christian tenet of divine, instantaneous, and ex
nihilo human creation, and the Court decided that the proper logical inference to be drawn from the
record was what the plaintiffs had alleged-that the purpose of the teaching ban was to prohibit
public school instruction of scientific knowledge that is offensive to believers in a particular sectarian
doctrine relating to the origin of man:
The overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge a particu-
lar segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a
particular religious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the Book of
Genesis by a particular religious group.
Id. at 103.
111. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
112. Id. at 41-42. The displays in question were required by statute to exhibit an explanation that
the secular nature of the Ten Commandments was clear from their "adoption" as the "fundamental
legal code of Western'civilization and the common law of the United States." 449 U.S. at 41. Though
it labeled the statutory declaration "self-serving," the trial court nevertheless found the purpose of the
statute to be secular. Id. The Court, however, determined that the legislative purpose for posting
displays of the Ten Commandments in a public school classroom could only be religious in nature:
The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian
faiths, and no recitation of a supposedly secular purpose can blind us to that fact. The
Commandments do not confine themselves to arguably secular matters. . . .Rather,
the first part of the Commandments concern the religious duties of believers. . . . If the
posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to
induce school children to read, to meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the
Commandments. However desirable this might be as a matter of private devotion, it is
not a permissible state objective under the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 41-42.
113. See, e.g., Personnel Admin'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275 (1979) (citing Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 428 U.S. 252, 266 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 242 (1976)).
114. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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mixtures is not itself unconstitutional, and because political bounda-
ries often are drawn piecemeal over time and for a wide variety of
non-rational but racially innocent reasons, a governmental defendant
will usually be able to provide a credible non-racial explanation for
why the boundary is where it is. However, none of these usual expla-
nations were available to explain the Gomillion statute that altered
"the shape of Tuskagee from a square to an uncouth 28-sided figure,"
and any attempt by the government to fabricate a non-racial explana-
tion would have been so contextually peculiar as to be unbelievable.115
Justifications of governmental action that impose disproportionate and un-
desirable burdens on certain classes of citizenry should be viewed with
judicial skepticism when these justifications do not correspond to general
knowledge or widely held presumptions about the way governmental bod-
ies normally act (or perhaps should act)."' This standard more clearly
illuminates the basis for the Court's decisions in Epperson and Stone.
Public schools unquestionably have a large measure of discretionary con-
trol over teaching curriculum, course content, methods of instruction, and
classroom materials.11 A variety of credible, non-religious justifications
usually are available for the withdrawal of any particular subject from, or
its inclusion in, the curriculum-the availability of space, materials, or
funds, the degree of student interest or teaching expertise, and the degree
of relevance to perceived educational needs. Given certain facts in Epper-
son1 8 and Stone,119 however, none of these usual explanations is a believ-
able justification for the singular banishment of Darwinian evolution from
the curriculum or for the prominent display of a sacred religious text on
classroom walls. The peculiarity of the states' actions, when viewed in the
115. Simon, supra note 62, at 1116 (quoting 364 U.S. at 340).
116. See Simon, supra note 62, at 1115-16; cf. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 794 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) ("Uurors'] experience may tell them ... that although the
plaintiff has introduced evidence and the defendant has offered nothing in opposition, it is still un-
likely that events occurred as contended by the plaintiff").
117. E.g., Island Trees School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869-72 (1982) (plurality opin-
ion). The Epperson statute was affirmed by the state court on precisely this ground. Epperson v.
Arkansas, 242 Ark. 922, 922, 416 S.W.2d 322, 322 (1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); see also 393
U.S. at 101 & n.7; id. at 111-14 (Black, J., concurring).
118. (1) The Arkansas statute admittedly was modelled after the Tennessee statute pursuant to
which the Scopes trial took place, 393 U.S. at 98; (2) the state failed even to attempt a secular
explanation of the statute, id. at 107; (3) the statute coincided with fundamentalist Christian doc-
trine, and fundamentalist Christianity is a majoritarian religion in Arkansas, id. at 107-08; and (4)
there were no convictions under the statute in its 45 years of existence, id. at 109 (Black, J.,
concurring).
119. (1) The Ten Commandments form part of a sacred text for both Christianity and Judaism,
449 U.S. at 41; (2) the content of the Commandments is not confined to secular matters, but covers
elements of religious worship and piety as well, id. at 41-42; and (3) the Commandments were not
integrated into the school curriculum so as to serve an educational function, id. at 42.
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context of normal 'public school curriculum and instruction decisions,
strongly suggests that the coincidence of the actions with predominant
religious beliefs was intended, and the coincidence in each case, thereby,
constitutes circumstantial proof of covert religious preference in violation
of the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test.120
Nevertheless, it may be constitutionally possible for the state to man-
date special instruction in areas that are religiously sensitive. Consider,
for example, a school district that has as part of its required high school
curriculum a biology course that includes study of experimental tests of
Darwin's theory of natural selection and related scientific theories ex-
plaining the origin of the different plant and animal species. The district
requires that a particular textbook be used in teaching the class. This text
critically examines and discusses all empirical findings without restriction.
Theoretical conclusions drawn from such findings are likewise discussed in
the book without restriction, insofar as they do not purport to explain the
creation and origin of the human species. Theoretical conclusions respect-
ing human origin are treated in a separate chapter. This chapter also de-
scriptively surveys and comparatively discusses the varying influence that
the evolutionary explanation of human origin has had on different social,
political, philosophical, and theological beliefs respecting human creation,
including how adherents of such views have attempted to reconcile their
distinctive views on the nature and origin of man with scientific data gen-
erated by the evolutionary model.' No special restrictions are placed on
the teacher,12 2 except that he or she must use this particular textbook and
must teach its survey chapter on human creation. A student and his par-
ents sue the district, arguing that requiring use of this text and requiring
that theological beliefs respecting human origin be taught together consti-
tute an establishment of religion.
In assessing the constitutionality of the directive, it is doubtful that a
court could construe the directive as requiring political or administrative
surveillance that would run afoul of the non-entanglement prong of the
Lemon test. 23 The directive probably would satisfy the effects prong as
120. See Ely, supra note 5, at 1318; see also Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 53.
121. Such a chapter could include, for example, discussions of the importance of the evolutionary
model to the intellectual development of such theories as dialectic materialism and social darwinism,
as well as treatment of the challenges that the model presented and continues to present to Christian
theology. It also might include a discussion of creationism. See generally Note, Freedom of Religion
and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515, 550-65 (1978).
122. See Note, The Constitutional Issues Surrounding the Science-Religion Conflict in the Pub-
lic Schools: The Anti-Evolution Controversy, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 461, 479-81 (1983) (noting
existence of independent speech rights of teacher); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 111,
113-14 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
123. For example, there is no competition for funds, government surveillance of religious person-
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well. There can be no argument about the secular educational character
of science, sociology, political science, or philosophy, and the objective
study of theology, when integrated into the curriculum to serve an educa-
tional purpose, has been endorsed by the Court."' The teaching of theol-
ogy concededly has some favorable effect on religion. In the context of a
survey including contradictory non-religious beliefs, however, one, can
fairly characterize that effect as being as "remote, indirect, and inciden-
tal" as the favorable effect that Sunday closing laws or public nativity
scenes have on Christian churches. These effects have been held insuffi-
cient to amount to establishment clause violations. 25 If the directive is
unconstitutional under the establishment clause, it must be for lack of a
secular purpose.
Case A. Assume that the school board offers no evidence at trial be-
yond a showing of its traditional control over curriculum and course con-
tent, and the plaintiffs offer evidence showing the following:
(1) A majority of the school board had frequently expressed in
other forums its view that the unbridled teaching of evolution was
destroying students' faith in God and promoting "materialistic and
immoral" behavior.12 6
(2) The particular textbook was chosen by the board because its
even-handed discussion of social, political, scientific, and philosophic
views of the nature and origin of man, as well as theological beliefs,
gave educational credibility to the board's directive.
(3) The curriculum change was neither considered nor recom-
mended by the board's curriculum committee, which was a deviation
from standard procedure, and was discussed and adopted by the board
at an improperly noticed meeting.
Case B. Assume that the plaintiffs offer no evidence but their interpre-
tation of the religious purposes, effects, and potential entanglements sug-
gested by the text of the directive, and the board offers evidence showing
the following:
(1) The directive was adopted in response to broad-based student,
parental, and community complaint that evolutionary theory was be-
ing used in classes to discredit and ridicule belief in the existence of a
nel or institutions, or government resolution of internal religious disputes. See generally L. Tribe,
supra note 6, at 865-80.
124. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (by implication); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224, 225 (1963).
125. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (sunday closing laws); Lynch v. Donnelly,
104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (nativity scene). See generally, L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 840.
126. Cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2490 & n.43 (1985) (post-enactment testimony of
legislative sponsor relied on to hold statute unconstitutional).
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Supreme Being. The school board's inquiry showed this to be the case
in fact.1 27
(2) The school board members felt that current biology texts were
not neutral between religion and non-religion in that they tended to
persuade students of an empirically undemonstrable view of real-
ity-that a Supreme Being does not exist-without recognizing the
existence of competing views of reality incorporating the existence of
a Supreme Being. The board concluded that even-handed, non-critical
discussion of the impact of the evolutionary model on a wide variety
of views of reality was the best accommodation of the various compet-
ing views and that the required textbook best incorporated this
approach.12 8
(3) Numerous alternatives were considered and rejected for legiti-
mate reasons.
129
The Case A evidence is sufficient to prove that a constitutionally imper-
missible motive-a desire to aid religion by teaching theistic principles in
a public school-played some part in the decision-making process. As-
suming that the board could not show that this part was inconsequen-
tial,"' the finder of fact should declare the directive unconstitutional
under the establishment clause for lack of a secular purpose.131
Case B, however, may well lead to a different result. The articulated
desire to remain neutral with respect to a controversial issue having both
secular and religious overtones, the specific inquiry into the facts, and the
measured consideration of alternatives, as well as the existence of a genu-
ine secular educational purpose (to inform students about the response of
the adherents of a number of socially common but ultimately unverifiable
theories of human nature and origin to the evolutionary model, without
127. See generally Note, supra note 121, at 532-36.
128. See generally Note, supra note 122, at 485-86 & n.152; Note, supra note 121, at 527 nn.56
& 57, 542-43, 550-55, 558-59 & n.213.
129. Regulation of the teacher's presentation of the material was rejected as too entangling and a
possible infringement of the teacher's speech rights; offering a separate course on theories of the
nature and origin of man was rejected as fiscally impracticable; teaching the unit in another class,
such as social studies, was rejected because student questions about the origin of man most often arise
in science classes, making such classes the most appropriate forum for discussion of the issue; and
allowing students to be excused from discussions of evolution and theology or prohibiting such discus-
sions altogether were rejected because they subverted the educational goal of preparing students to
make informed and mature value choices. See generally Note, supra note 121, at 523.
130. Cf Mount Healthy School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1978) (showing of constitutionally
impermissible purpose for governmental action may be rebutted by preponderance of evidence that
such purpose played no role in decision to take such action).
131. See, e.g., Daniels v. Walters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975); McLean v. Arkansas, 529 F.
Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex.
1972), afjid, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973); Smith v. State, 242 So.2d 692 (Miss. 1970).
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appearing to endorse or approve any particular one) 13 2 evidence the lack
of any intent to promote religious belief in the manner prohibited by the
establishment clause. In the absence of proof of primary religious effects
or potential entanglements, a court should uphold the directive against an
establishment clause challenge. 183
b. The Symbolic Identification of Government and Religion
In Lynch v. Donnelly,"' the Court considered an establishment clause
challenge to a municipality's inclusion of a traditional nativity scene as
part of a larger secular display depicting various observances of the
Christmas holiday. The trial court found that by including the nativity
scene in the display, the municipality had endorsed and promoted reli-
gious beliefs and, by affiliating the municipality with Christian beliefs and
giving the appearance of official sponsorship, had conferred a substantial
benefit on Christianity. The Supreme Court, however, determined that
"the primary purpose of including the nativity scene in the larger display
was not to promote religion, but to celebrate the public holiday through
its traditional symbols," which the Court validated as a legitimate and
secular purpose. 185
Government action that harmonizes with majoritarian religious beliefs
or practices, whether by design or otherwise, often imposes substantial
burdens on the exercise of religion by non-conforming religious minori-
ties.' 36 These burdens have often been held unconstitutional under the
free exercise clause.1 87 When the religious effects or potential entangle-
ments of the action are substantial, the actions may be struck down as
unconstitutional under the establishment clause as well. Cases such as
Lynch in which government associates itself with religion by use of a reli-
132. See Note, supra note 121, at 561; Note, supra note 122, at 485; see also Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
133. See generally Note, Teaching the Theories of Evolution and Scientific Creationism in the
Public Schools: The First Amendment Religion Clauses and Permissible Relief, 15 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 421, 459-60 (1982).
134. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
135. Id. at 1364. The Court characterized the religious effects of the nativity scene as merely
incidentally harmonizing with Christian religious beliefs, and analogized the effect of the scene to the
effect of the numerous religious works of art which passively hang in government museums. Id. at
1365. The Court further found that the only evidence of "political divisiveness" under the entangle-
ment prong was the litigation before the Court, and held that the political divisiveness that would
render governmental action unconstitutional could not be created merely by filing a lawsuit. Id.
136. Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1476 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rebuilding the
Wall); see also Note, Abortion Laws, Religious Beliefs and the First Amendment, 14 VAL. U.L. REV.
487, 504-06 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Abortion Laws].
137. See, e.g., supra note 33.
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gious symbol, however, are difficult because, despite the coincidence of
government action and religious belief, they generally entail no legal ob-
stacle or other burden on the exercise of minority rights and have little
other demonstrably religious impact.
Nevertheless, the coincidence of government action with majoritarian
religious beliefs or practices should be suspect under the establishment
clause because it appears to align the coercive power of the government
with predominant religious beliefs or practices, and against minority reli-
gious and non-religious beliefs or practices. The resultant appearance of
government approval or endorsement of the coincident beliefs or practices
thereby impedes or "chills"' 138 adherence to and exercise of inconsistent
beliefs and practices, both religious and non-religious. 39 Adherents of
other religions or of no religion who do not accept the coincident religious
belief or practice are implicitly, though unmistakably, disapproved by the
government. This distorts normal patterns of religious voluntarism by im-
posing an external benefit-implicit government approval-to acceptance
of the belief or practice and a corresponding external cost-implicit gov-
ernment disapproval-to non-acceptance. 41
Lower courts' 4' have not always recognized that any constitutionally
significant religious impact results from government use of or association
with religious symbols.142 The Court itself has held that governmental ac-
tion that incidentally advances religion does not, for that reason alone,
violate the establishment clause.'43 The Court also has held, however, that
governmental action intended to promote or to burden a particular reli-
gious belief or practice is unconstitutional. "' Thus, careful scrutiny of
138. Cf Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (vague statutory language compels those
wishing to avoid violation of law to restrict "their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe").
139. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962); Note, Rebuilding the Wall, supra note 136, at
1476; see also Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 164; Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 1373, 1385 & n.105 (1981); Note, supra note 5, at 959, 960-61.
140. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2497 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); Lynch v. Donnelly,
104 S. Ct. 1355, 1373 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. Before Lynch, the Supreme Court had never addressed this issue. See Lynch v. Donnelly,
104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
142. Compare Stone v. McCreary, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), affid by equally divided Court,
Village of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985); Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of
Eugene, 276 Or. 1007, 558 P.2d 338 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977); Opinion of the
Justices, 108 N.H. 97, 228 A.2d 161 (1967); and Paul v. Dade County, 202 So. 2d 833 (Fla. App.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968) with ACLU of Georgia v. Rabun County Chamber of
Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983); and Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792,
587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978). See also Laycock, supra note 130, at 1383-84.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
144. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980);
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secular purpose is critical to determine whether the harmonization of gov-
ernment and religion is intentional or not. 145 When the scrutiny enables a
court to conclude that the government's goals are both believable and le-
gitimate, the harmonization of governmental action and religious belief or
practice should be constitutionally acceptable. 146
The Court has long rejected a strict rule of no-aid to religion, as it has
rejected a strict rule of no-burden. 47 Accordingly, neutrality is not vio-
lated when religion is aided or burdened as part of a larger, secular group
or classification similarly aided or burdened, as long as it is clear that the
governmental action was taken in spite of, rather than because of, the
religious aid or burden .1 8 As with other forms of discrimination or pref-
erence, the invidious nature of religious discrimination or preference is not
present when the disproportionate aid to or burden on the religious person
or group can credibly be shown to be the result, not of the absence or
presence of religious belief or practice, but of classification of the person
or group with other religious and non-religious persons or groups on the
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
145. When even slight religious effects are deemed constitutionally fatal under the primary effect
prong of the Lemon test, scrutiny of legislative purpose is less important because most governmental
action falling under the establishment clause at least trivially promotes or burdens religion. When,
however, more substantial religious impact is tolerated under the establishment clause, scrutiny of
motive is critical to ensure that the government is not pursuing constitutionally prohibited goals. See
Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 103. Failure to scrutinize sufficiently governmental motivation may result
in governmental action being permitted under the establishment clause despite the government's mo-
tive to discriminate disproportionately against or in favor of a particular religion or religion generally.
If the establishment clause is to guard against the distortion of patterns of religious voluntarism that
occur when the government aligns itself for or against the beliefs of practices of a religion or religion
generally, then it follows that governmental intent to aid or hinder religion is as much as establish-
ment clause violation as actual aid or hindrance. Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion
Clauses, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 193, 212 & n.77 (establishment clause concerned with psychic and
moral affront caused by religious discrimination or favoritism by government); see Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Gardner, supra note 5, at 157 ("to disadvantage a group essentially
out of dislike is surely to deny its members equal concern and respect, specifically by valuing their
welfare negatively"); Bennett, supra note 65, at 1075; Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamen-
tal Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 964-67 (1978) (laws enacted because
of illicit motivation stigmatize victims and breach the public trust); cf. Simon, supra note 62, at 1047,
1051 (racially prejudiced governmental actions insult, stigmatize, and demean the dignity of the
group members towards whom the prejudice is held).
146. See J. ELY, supra note 70, at 153; Bennett, supra note 65, at 1076; cf. Personnel Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (state veterans preference hiring statute having overwhelming dis-
criminatory effect on women held constitutional in absence of evidence that discriminatory effect was
intended).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 21-37.
148. Conflicting evidence of government motivation still will raise a causation issue notwithstand-
ing an initial determination that the government's articulated goals are constitutionally legitimate.
See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
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basis of commonly shared secular characteristics. 149 Because any costs of
nonconformance are not (and thus should not generally be perceived as)
the result of a government desire to disproportionately burden religion,
those who bear the costs are not stigmatized by governmental disapproval
and cannot be characterized as bearing the costs unfairly. Similarly, be-
cause the government is not (and should not generally be perceived as)
animated by a desire to promote majoritarian religious practices or be-
liefs, conforming believers are not for that reason reinforced in their be-
liefs.18 0 Thus, scrutiny of motive may preserve religious voluntarism when
149. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069 (1983); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
696-97 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Laycock, supra
note 139, at 1384; see also J. ELY, supra note 70, at 153; Bennett, supra note 60 at 1076; Bice,
Motivational Analysis as a Complete Explanation of the Justification Process, 15 SAN DIEGo L.
REv. 1131, 1139 (1978); Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 157.
The Court recently decided the case of a handicapped student who qualified for post-secondary
financial educational assistance under a state vocational rehabilitation program, but was denied such
assistance solely because he was studying to be a minister at a sectarian college. Witters v. State
Comm'n for the Blind, 54 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1986). Under the foregoing analysis (which
differs from that of the Court), a denial of the aid in this case is not required by the establishment
clause because the student qualified for the aid solely on the basis of his status as a handicapped
student, a clearly secular criterion. Because the influence of government is not being used dispropor-
tionately to encourage or discourage the choice of entering the ministry, to grant aid in such a situa-
tion sends no message of government approval. See infra note 150 and accompanying text; cf Muel-
ler v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069 (1983) ("[wjhere ... aid to parochial schools is available only as
a result of decisions of individual parents, no 'imprimatur of state approval' can be deemed to have
been conferred on any religion generally") (citation omitted). Indeed, to deny assistance in such a
situation solely because of the religious avocation of the student actually would subvert establishment
clause neutrality by favoring non-religious recipients of rehabilitation aid over religious recipients. See
supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
150. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2497 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("direct
government action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid because it 'sends a
message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political com-
munity' ") (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring));
see Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitu-
tion, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 847, 881-83 (1984).
In concurring opinions in Jaffree and Lynch, Justice O'Connor has proposed a refinement of the
Lemon test that would narrow the purpose inquiry to whether the government subjectively intended to
endorse religion, and the effects inquiry to whether the governmental action under review actually
sends a message of religious endorsement. See 105 S. Ct. at 2479; 104 S. Ct. at 1368-69. In Jaffree,
Justice O'Connor elaborated the effects prong of Lemon, her version of the test when she argued that
"Itjhe relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history,
and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public
schools." 105 S. Ct. at 2497. Because its only prohibited religious effect is the appearance of govern-
ment endorsement of religion, however, Justice O'Connor's version of the Lemon test apparently col-
lapses the effects test into the purpose test; it would seem improbable that an "objective observer"
could perceive a state endorsement of religion in any action with respect to which the state can show
with relevant evidence that it was subjectively motivated by secular concerns. In other words, if a
statute does not reference religion in its text, contains evidence of legitimate secular goals in its
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government pursues goals in a manner that entails the appearance of gov-
ernment endorsement or disapproval of religion by revealing that the mo-
tives of the governmental decision-makers are secular and neutral with
respect to religion.151
The Lynch decision is instructive. In that case, the Court engaged in
careful scrutiny of the articulated legislative purposes of the challenged
action. The Court found that the government did not undertake the chal-
lenged action to promote or to burden the beliefs or practices of any par-
legislative history and is efficiently implemented in a manner consistent with such goals, it is unlikely
that anyone familiar with such evidence nevertheless could discern in the statute a state endorsement
of religion.
151. See Note, supra note 5, at 966. Of course, governmental acts that closely align the govern-
ment with religion still may be found unconstitutional under the Lemon test if their primary effect
(apart from any appearance of government endorsement or disapproval of religion) is to advance
religion, or if they entangle government and religion in each other's affairs. But see supra note 150.
The analysis in text would become more relevant to the Court's establishment clause decisions in the
event that the Court abandons or relaxes the entanglement prong of the Lemon test, which has come
under growing criticism. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3243 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2518 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Choper,
supra note 9, at 681-85; Ripple, supra note 83, at 1204-30; see also supra note 50. A number of the
Court's decisions finding parochial school aid programs unconstitutional under the establishment
clause rest solely on the potential for excessive entanglement between church and state and the appar-
ent government endorsement of religion inherent in such programs. See. e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105
S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). The Court has long and consistently determined that
public aid to private schools serves the clear and predominant secular purposes of providing educa-
tional opportunities to large groups of school-aged children and (not incidentally) of alleviating finan-
cial pressures and overcrowding in the public schools. See supra note 82. In the absence of entangle-
ment as a test of constitutionality under the establishment clause, private school aid programs that
are designed to provide private school students with educational programs and opportunities that are
already available to public students through the general public school curriculum, and that are not
otherwise available to private school students, see, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3234-35 &
n.6 (1985), could be characterized as merely providing aid to religious schools incidentally as part of
a broader secular classification-i.e., schools in general, both public and private. See Johnson, supra
note 21, at 822; Note, The.Supreme Court, Effect Inquiry, and Aid to Parochial Education, 37
STAN. L. REV. 219, 232 (1984). Because parents and guardians of private school students support two
school systems-the private school system through the payment of tuition and the public school sys-
tem through the payment of property and other taxes-such programs arguably can be characterized
as merely providing the educational opportunities that already have been paid for by such individuals
through their tax support of public education. See id. at 242-43 & n.100 (discussing Choper, The
Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260, 2675-66 (1968) (argu-
ing government can reimburse parochial schools for full value of secular education provided)). Be-
cause the government should be able to show in such a situation that it was motivated to establish an
aid program by a legitimate secular goal, and that parochial schools are being aided only as part of a
broader scheme to aid all public and private schools in such a manner as to equalize the edcational
opportunities for all school-age children within the jurisdiction of the local school authority, and not
disproportionately to favor parochial schools, the appearance of government aid to religion should not
have constitutional significance under the establishment clause. See supra text accompanying note
146.
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ticular religion or religion generally, but only as part of a display to de-
pict both secular and religious symbols utilized by the citizenry in
celebrating a holiday with both secular and religious significance. The
finding that this purpose was clearly predominant dissolved the apparent
endorsement of Christianity by the city.1 ' 2 Indeed, exclusion of either the
secular or the religious symbols from the display would be a departure
from religious neutrality by the government, with a consequent advance-
ment or burdening of Christianity. Thus, the Court could conclude that
inclusion of the creche in the city's display was no threat to non-
establishment. 1 53
c. Religiously Motivated Legislators and Religious Lobbies
The Court's most recent abortion funding case, Harris v. McRae,""
illustrates further applications of motive analysis in the establishment
clause context. In Harris, opponents of the Hyde Amendment, 155 which
eliminated Medicaid funding for most abortions, argued that the premise
of the funding termination is the belief that the fetus is a human being,
and that this belief, being grounded in metaphysical assumptions about
the nature of man and also being scientifically or otherwise empirically
undemonstrable, is for that reason religious.1 56 Opponents of the Hyde
Amendment further argued that support of the Amendment by Catholic,
fundamentalist Protestant, Mormon, and Orthodox Jewish organizations,
and the coincidence of the anti-abortion beliefs of these organizations
with the belief that the fetus is human render the Amendment unconstitu-
152. The plaintiffs had argued that the city's display of the nativity scene constituted government
endorsement and approval of Christianity and emphasized the minority status of those with noncon-
forming beliefs. 104 S. Ct. at 1373-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1366. Under this analysis, publicly sponsored religious displays violate the establish-
ment clause unless they occur in a context that includes related secular displays so as to make clear
government neutrality. See generally Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dictum).
Privately sponsored religious displays on government property arguably are constitutional even in the
absence of related secular displays, despite the appearance of government sponsorship, on the theory
that religious groups and individuals, as all of the public, have a right of equal access to public
forums. Compare Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3rd Cir. 1984) cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 1167 (1985) with Stone v. McCreary, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), affd by
equally divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985); cf infra note 218. Full discussion of the relationship
between the establishment clause and more general First Amendment freedom of speech theories is
beyond the scope of this Article.
154. 448 U.S. 297 (1980), rev'g McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
155. Pub. L. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979).
156. 448 U.S. at 318-19; McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd sub.
nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see also Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972
Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv.
1, 18-32 (1973); Note, Abortion Laws, supra note 136, at 494.
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tional under the establishment clause as a preference by Congress of the
religious beliefs of these organizations regarding abortion and the human-
ness of the fetus. 157
The Court rejected these arguments. Noting that the Hyde Amend-
ment "is as much a reflection of 'traditionalist' values toward abortion, as
it is an embodiment of the views of any particular religion," the Court
held that the coincidence of the funding restrictions with certain religious
beliefs does not "without more" constitute a violation of the establishment
clause. 158
The argument advanced in Harris depends on the validity of the asser-
tion that belief in the humanness of the fetus is necessarily and exclu-
sively religious. Beliefs are not inevitably religious merely because they
are based on metaphysical or otherwise empirically undemonstrable as-
sumptions. 159 In particular, a belief in the humanness of the fetus can be
justified by reference solely to secular philosophical and ethical author-
ity."' 0 The Court's rejection of the argument, therefore, may simply be
the result of the opponents' failure to persuade the Court that a belief in
the humanness of the fetus is necessarily and exclusively a religious
belief.'
Nevertheless, Harris raises an important issue relating to the use of
motive analysis in establishment clause cases: is the secular purpose prong
157. 448 U.S. at 319; see McRae v. Califano, 491 F.Supp. at 690-728 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd
sub. nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See generally Note, supra note 5, at 946 n.18;
Ecumenical War Over Abortion, TIME, Jan. 29, 1979, at 62; Abortion Funding: A Case of Religious
War, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1979, pt. IV (Opinion Section), at 5, col. 1. (editorial); A Singular Issue,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1978, at col. 1. Opponents of the Hyde Amendment introduced evidence at trial
showing that certain members of Congress, including the Amendment's principal congressional propo-
nents, voted in favor of the Amendment because of their belief that the fetus is a human being
entitled to protection against deprivation of life under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. 491 F.Supp. at 630, 690-727, rev'd, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
158. Harris, 448 U.S. at 319-20.
159. See, e.g., Note, Abortion Laws, supra note 136, at 497 n.64, 498 n.65. But see, e.g., Mullins,
Creation Science and McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education: The Hazards of Judicial Inquiry
into Motive, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 345, 385 (1982) (transcendental beliefs are religious);
Note, Rebuilding the Wall, supra note 136, at 1479 & nn.101 & 103 (arguing that government
should be barred under the establishment clause from advocating or advancing any metaphysical
perspective).
160. See, e.g., S. KRASON, ABORTION: POLITICS, MORALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 441-63, 468-
73 (1984) (anti-abortion argument derived from Aristotelian and Stoic philosophy); Gensler, A Kant-
ian Argument Against Abortion, 48 PHIL. STUDIES 57 (1985); Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in
History in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE (R. Hunt & J. Arras ed. 1977) (arguing that the
least arbitrary point at which to recognize the humanness of the fetus is conception). See generally
McCrae v. Califano, 491 F.Supp. 630, 741 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub. nom. Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S.
297, 319 (1980); Mullins, supra note 159, at 385.
161. Cf Note, supra note 5, at 971 (unless the dominant legislative acts can be characterized as
having advocated a clearly religious position, a law does not have a religious character).
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of the Lemon test violated when legislation objectively shown to have a
secular purpose also is shown to have been sponsored or otherwise sup-
ported by legislators subjectively motivated by their personal religious be-
liefs or preferences? Put in terms of the justification model, is direct evi-
dence of religious motivation (consisting of the subjective views of
participants in the governmental decision-making process) dispositive of
the issue of secular purpose, or can this evidence be controverted by cir-
cumstantial evidence of permissible secular motivation (consisting of the
demonstration of credible, constitutionally legitimate governmental goals
achieved by the challenged action)?16
At the outset, one should recognize that any resolution of the issue
which permits the subjective religious motivations of governmental deci-
sionmakers to form the basis of a determination of unconstitutionality
would raise serious and significant free speech and free exercise issues. 163
This by itself may be a compelling argument against this resolution of the
issues. Even setting aside free exercise consideration, however, one en-
162. See Note, Abortion Laws, supra note 136, at 499-500.
163. E.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Lay-
cock, supra note 139, at 1379; Mullins, supra note 159, at 389; Note, Religion and Political Cam-
paigns: A Proposal to Revise Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 49 FORDHAM L. REV.
536, 554 (1981); Note, supra note 5, at 950; Note, Abortion Laws, supra note 136, at 523. Religious
organizations and beliefs have always played an integral part in the development of Western thought
and culture. See generally H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION ch. 11 (1974);
Fitch, Can There Be Morality Without Religion? in RELIGION, MORALITY AND LAW (A. Harding ed.
1956) (arguing religion is indispensable to development of systems of morality); Schwarz, No Imposi-
tion of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 712-13 (1968) (same). Presum-
ably, this is one reason why religion is valued by a pluralistic community. See Schwarz, supra, at 713;
L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 881. Individual members of the Court have adverted to the social value of
religion, see, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970); id. at 693 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); id. at 696-97 (opinion of Harlan, J.), and, indeed, the very existence of both the free exercise
and the establishment clause arguably evidences a societal judgment that religious persons and orga-
nizations are valued members of society and worthy of protection, independent of concern for consid-
erations of individual conscience. See generally H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELI-
GION ch. I (1974); Gianella II, supra note 12, at 521. A judgment that personal religious belief
should not be used, either by governmental decisionmakers or by those who seek to influence such
decisions, as a predicate for their participation in the political process not only assumes that religion
has no social value, it also presupposes that religion is socially harmful. Not surprisingly, the Court
has recognized the legitimacy under the establishment clause of attempts by religious individuals and
organizations to persuade others of the correctness of their views in the free marketplace of ideas.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970); e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); see
Laycock, supra note 139, at 1379. On the other hand, the Court has never construed the free exercise
clause as protecting an unqualified right to engage in all action motivated by religious belief, e.g.,
Estate of Thornton v. Calder, 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-
66 (1878), and domination of any public forum or government body by religious individuals could
lead the Court to a different result. See Mansfield, supra note 150, at 884-88; Note, supra note 151,
at 224-25 & n.33. Consideration of the conflict between free exercise, anti-establishment, and free-
dom of speech values in this context is beyond the scope of this Article.
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counters complex issues surrounding the legitimacy of such a rule under
the establishment clause.
Resolution of the issue should not turn on whether direct evidence of
illicit motives should be accorded more weight than circumstantial evi-
dence of legitimate motives, as is sometimes argued, 164 because what ap-
pears to be direct evidence of institutional motivation is itself usually only
circumstantial evidence. Legislatures and most other governmental deci-
sion makers are multi-member bodies. Although relevant statements by
an individual member of such a body constitute evidence that is highly
probative of the motivations of that member, they tell little about the
motivations of other members, and, thus, little about the motivations of
the decision-making body as a whole:
Admissions by individual members . . . are relevant to institutional
motivation only because the individual is part of the institution and
his admission . . . therefore tells us something about his role in the
institution's action. However, such statements . . . have little indepen-
dent probative value concerning institutional motivation, for one
member's motivation, standing alone, provides no information about
others' motives. 16 5
Evidence of individual member motivation is not irrelevant; indeed, evi-
dence of the illicit motivation of a sufficiently large number of members 66
(or, perhaps, of certain key members) 67 may enable a court to conclude
that the institutional motivation also was illicit. This evidence, however,
though direct as to the motivations of the individuals, is only circumstan-
tial as to the motivation of the institution-i.e., of the governmental deci-
sionmaker, which is the only motivation that counts in making the judg-
ment of constitutionality. 68 Evidence of illicit motivation of individual
members, though clearly relevant to the inquiry into institutional motiva-
tion, is entitled to no greater probative weight than other circumstantial
evidence of institutional motivation.
It can be argued that successful religious lobbying does not result in an
unconstitutionally religious legislative motivation because of the nature of
164. See, e.g., Note, Abortion Laws, supra note 136, at 499-500.
165. Simon, supra note 62, at 1107; see also id. at 1098, 1103-04, 1105-06.
166. Id. at 1108, 1109-10.
167. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (holding law unconstitutional based in part
on evidence of constitutionally illicit motives of legislative sponsor); Bennett, supra note 65, at 1073
("Most legislation is shaped by only a few legislators. [lI]mputed purpose allows legislative purpose to
be defined by the purposes of those few"); see J. Ely, supra note 67, at 27 ("the statements of floor
leaders are precisely where we should look to determine the purpose [of a law], since that is where
those who were voting would have sought it"); see also Note, Abortion Laws, supra note 136, at 499.
168. Simon, supra note 62, at 1106-07.
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the legislative process. In order to gain the support of non-believers for a
particular public policy position, a religious person or organization gener-
ally must be able to appeal to broader-based, secular authority, for it
must be able to persuade those who do not recognize the religion as a
source of legitimate authority." 9 If the religious person or organization is
unable to articulate supporting arguments in secular terms, the subse-
quent legislation will be viewed as parochial and religiously motivated.
Even if the legislation is somehow enacted, it would probably be judicially
overturned. 170 To the extent that a legislator is successful in universalizing
in secular terms an originally religious belief as a justification for pro-
posed legislation, he or she also succeeds in secularizing the legislative
motivation for passing the legislation. 1 This type of law presents no gov-
ernment identification with religion and, consequently, no chilling effect
on non-conformists because the secularization of the underlying religious
motivation removes the religious label from the legislation. 72 Thus, the
government is not identified with an overtly religious belief or practice,
but with a secularly justifiable one that also is supported by religious peo-
ple or organizations for their own reasons."1 The articulation by the reli-
gious legislator or lobbyist of credible goals for desired governmental ac-
tion in purely secular terms removes the taint that might otherwise attach
to governmental action supported by religious legislators or a religious
lobby. 74
169. See Mullins, supra note 159, at 385-86; Note, supra note 5, at 971; see also Johnson, supra
note 21, at 827. Even those who are inclined to support such legislation for reasons unrelated to its
secular merits, see infra text accompanying notes 175-76, must be supplied a usable rationalization
for their support. See Bennett, supra note 65, at 1082.
170. Commentators agree that bald legislative favoritism for a very narrow interest group that
cannot otherwise be justified is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 65, at 1082; Ely, supra
note 5, at 1237-38. This would appear to be premised on an application of the "public interest"
normative standard to the legislative process. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
171. Cf Bennett, supra note 65, at 1072 ("A legislator who compromises with other legislators
while negotiating legislation he will eventually favor can be said to adopt as a part of his purpose the
similarly qualified purposes of those with whom he reaches agreement"); J. ELY, supra note 67, at
144 ("[wlhat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what moti-
vates his colleagues to enact it").
172. See Note, supra note 5, at 971 (unless dominant legislative actors can be characterized as
having advocated a clearly religious position, a law does not have a religious character).
173. Choper, supra note 9, at 684; see Drakeman, Prayer in the Schools: Is New Jersey's Mo-
ment of Silence Law Constitutional? 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 341, 355 (1983) ("the pious hopes of one
or two misguided legislators" should not invalidate an otherwise proper statute intended by the vast
majority of legislators to achieve purely secular goals); see also J. Ely, supra note 70, at 128 n.*;
Anastaplo, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 11 MEMPHIS ST. UL. REV. 151, 173
(1981) ("it should not matter . . . for constitutional purposes, what a church believes or wants with
respect to its 'religious mission.' Its perceptions, interests and expectations should be irrelevant to how
the public should respond to the rather obvious activities of church members") (emphasis in original).
174. Cf Mullins, supra note 159, at 364-65:
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The legislative process, however, rarely is so principled. Often legisla-
tors will support legislation aiding or burdening religion simply because of
the power, influence, and financial resources of the supporting religious or
other lobby, irrespective of the credibility of any articulated secular
goals. 17 5 Indeed, secular goals may not even be voiced at all, with support
coming as the result of party or constituent pressure, vote-trading or other
exchanges of legislative favors, or for no apparent reason at all. 7  Even
on its merits, governmental action often may be justified by reference to
both religious and non-religious authority and arguments.
When government acts in a context that indicates religious belief
played a role in the passage of legislation, the decisive issue should not be
the subjective reasons why lobbyists or decision-makers valued the legisla-
tive result, or whether the reasons are predicated on religious preferences.
Instead, the appropriate inquiry is whether justifications for the legislation
can credibly be articulated in such a way as to show that the government
is acting, not in the narrow interests of religious (or anti-religious) inter-
est groups, but for the broader, secular "public interest.' 77 Evidence of
religious states of mind of decision-makers or lobbyists is clearly relevant
to this inquiry.1 78 When the government fails to articulate believable secu-
lar legislative goals,' 7 9 or when the articulated goals poorly fit the impact
of the challenged action, 80 evidence that prominent decision-makers or
influential lobbyists supported the action because of its coincidence with
favored religious beliefs or practices of a particular religion will tend to
reinforce the inference that the government intended to use its coercive
power disproportionately to favor the beliefs or practices and to burden
religious and nonreligious beliefs and practices that do not conform.' 8'
When, however, governmental action that disproportionately favors or dis-
favors religion can credibly be defended by reference to legitimate secular
purposes, evidence of subjective religious motivations should not serve au-
if [objective inquiry] is insufficient to establish an unconstitutional purpose or motive,
one of two possibilities exists: either the act is a bona fide exercise of legislative power,
or the legislature has been so careful about disguising underlying motives that those
motives are not manifested in any significant way in the objective world in which the
statute was developed or is operating.
175. See Bice, supra note 65, at 22.
176. Id.; cf J. Ely, supra note 70, at 127 ("[pleople often vote for measures for reasons sufficient
to themselves even though no one else has put those reasons on the record"); see also id. at 130 n.*.
177. See Gardner, supra note 5, at 484-85; Note, Rebuilding the Wall, supra note 136, at 1475.
178. See Choper, supra note 9, at 684.
179. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2490-91 & nn.43-45 (1985); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 n.11 (1968).
180. See supra text accompanying note 76.
181. See Simon, supra note 62, at 1106, 1114-15.
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tomatically to invalidate the action; the evidence should simply be
weighted in the balance with other direct and circumstantial evidence of
institutional motives.'82 In most cases, strong evidence of the predomi-
nance of subjective religious motivations will be required to overcome sec-
ularly defensible governmental action. 8a8
Harris can be explained, therefore, by the burden shifting role that evi-
dence of governmental motive plays in a justification model of the estab-
lishment clause. When governmental action results in disproportionate re-
ligious impacts, evidence of impermissible government motives does not
dispose of the constitutional question; the evidence merely shifts the bur-
den to the government to prove that the impermissible motive did not
have a significant effect on the decision to take the challenged action.
Similarly, the coincidence of the abortion funding restrictions in Harris
with certain religious beliefs, coupled with evidence of religious motiva-
tions on the part of some legislators who were prominent in the passage of
the restrictions, did not by itself permit a finding of unconstitutionality
under the establishment clause; it merely shifted the burden to the gov-
ernment to prove that the illicit motives were not significant motivations
for Congress as an institution.' 84
Although the Court, in Harris, did not explicitly employ this analysis,
its language and holding are consistent with it. In Roe v. Wade, 8 6 the
Court held that protection of the fetus as potential human life was a legit-
imate government goal. 88 The Court's analysis in Harris and in previous
abortion funding decisions validated funding restrictions as a rational pur-
suit of this goal by characterizing the restrictions as subsidies by the gov-
ernment to encourage the choice of pregnancy without prohibiting the
choice of abortion. 8 7 Significantly, the Court also found that the funding
restriction did not burden the exercise of any fundamental rights.18 8 The
182. See supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
183. See J. ELY, supra note 70, at 138 ("It will be next to impossible for a court responsibly to
conclude that a decision was affected by an unconstitutional motivation whenever it is possible to
articulate a plausible legitimate explanation for the action taken"); cf. Drakeman, supra note 173, at
354-55 (when governmental action coincides with religious beliefs or practices and such action is not
mandated by the free exercise clause, a minimal evidentiary showing of religious purpose should lead
to a judgment of unconstitutionality "unless the court is offered extremely strong countervailing evi-
dence justifying the statute on secular grounds").
184. See generally Note, supra note 5, at 974-75.
185. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
186. Id. at 150.
187. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977).
188. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17, 311-23. (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-
71 (1977). Thus, Harris is consistent with the Court's toleration of burdens on nonconforming reli-
gious beliefs under the establishment clause when free exercise values are not infringed. See supra
text accompanying notes 36-38.
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government's articulation of a credible and legitimate state goal efficiently
implemented by the funding restrictions counted as circumstantial evi-
dence that controverted other circumstantial evidence of illicit institu-
tional motivation and enabled the Court to uphold the restriction."'A
d. Public School Prayer
Twenty-three years ago, in Abington School District v. Schempp, 90 the
Court considered two challenges to public school use of the Bible and the
Lord's Prayer in an exercise which opened each school day. Although the
state articulated several permissible secular purposes for this use of the
Bible and the Lord's Prayer, the Court found that the district's failure to
utilize equally-as-effective, less-religious alternatives revealed a religious
purpose for the challenged uses, and held the exercises unconstitutional
under the establishment clause. 191
The Schempp majority did not clearly signal whether the case was de-
cided under a purpose or an effects analysis. However, Schempp cannot
be explained by reference to the primary secular effect prong of the
Lemon test. Although the disputed exercise might have been character-
ized as so laced with religious effects as to be an establishment clause
violation on that ground alone, 19 the inconsistency of the state's adminis-
tration of the exercise with its articulated secular goals' 93 would then
have been irrelevant, for even a practice which perfectly implements legis-
lative goals will be unconstitutional under the establishment clause if it
189. See Note, supra note 5, at 974-75.
190. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
191. The majority focused its inquiry on whether the disputed exercise was "religious" in charac-
ter, reasoning that if it were, the exercise would constitute state aid of religion in violation of estab-
lishment clause neutrality. The state articulated four secular justifications for using the Bible and the
Lord's Prayer in the exercise: to promote moral values, to combat materialism, to perpetuate tradi-
tional social institutions, and to teach literature. The Court observed, however, that the Bible is un-
questionably an instrument of religion and concluded that the exercise must have had significant
religious overtones because the state specifically provided for optional reading from the Catholic as
well as the King James Version of the Bible, and also permitted children to be excused from class
during the exercise if they so desired. Noting that these two provisions are inconsistent with secular
use of the Bible for teaching social values or literature, the Court concluded that, despite the state's
articulated secular goals, the challenged action nevertheless violated the establishment clause. 374
U.S. at 223-24.
192. See id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring):
[M]uch has been written about the moral and spiritual values of infusing some religious
influence or instruction into the public school classroom. To the extent that only reli-
gious materials will serve this purpose, it seems to me that the purpose as well as the
means is so plainly religious that the exercise is necessarily forbidden by the Establish-
ment Clause.
193. Id. at 224; see supra text accompanying note 78.
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fails the effects prong. That the Court considered this inconsistency im-
portant in rationalizing its decision indicates that it struck down the exer-
cise because of its failure to satisfy the secular purpose prong.
In his concurring opinion in Schempp, Justice Brennan states that the
Court's establishment clause cases "forbid the use of religious means to
achieve secular ends where non-religious means would suffice." 19 When a
governmental decision with respect to a legitimate goal imposes dispropor-
tionate costs on a religious or non-religious minority without consideration
of equally-as-effective alternatives that are less costly or that more equita-
bly spread the cost, one reasonably may infer that the government in-
tended to discriminate against the minority by passage of the legisla-
tion. 9 Thus, the state's choice of a pervasive religious means to
implement its legitimate secular goals, as opposed to an equally-as-effec-
tive, less-religious alternative, 19 evidenced purposeful state preference of
religion in violation of the establishment clause.
Although the School Prayer Cases 97 remain controversial, the Court
has never reconsidered them and it appears to be well settled that incor-
poration of oral prayer into the public school day is an establishment
clause violation. However, many states have passed so called "moment of
silence" laws. These statutes generally provide for a short period of si-
lence (usually one minute) at the beginning of each school day. Students
may do what they please during this period so long as they remain quiet
and seated. The laws also generally provide either that students who do
not wish to be present during the period of silence may be excused from
attending or, alternatively, that students who are present during the pe-
riod obtain special parental consent to be present.198
194. Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring); accord McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 462, 466-
67 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
195. See Brest, supra note 5, at 122-23; Simon, supra note 62, at 1120-21. See generally supra
text accompanying note 102. Alternatively, the requirement that the state choose the least intrusive
religious alternative may serve to highlight the constitutionally proper balance of competing state and
individual interests when preferred rights such as religious freedom are implicated by state action.
See supra text accompanying note 75.
196. Justice Brennan suggested as secular alternatives reading excerpts from the speeches and
writings of famous Americans or from "the documents of our heritage of liberty," reciting the Pledge
of Allegiance or observing a moment of silence at the start of each school day. 374 U.S. at 281
(concurring opinion). Twenty-two years later, however, Justice Brennan voted with a majority of the
Court to overturn a law providing for a moment of silence at the beginning of the public school day.
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
197. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
198. For a comprehensive listing and description of such statutues, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.
Ct. 2479, 2498 n.l (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Note, The Unconstitutionality of State Stat-
utes Authorizing Moments of Silence in the Public Schools, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1874, 1874 n.1 (1983)
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In Wallace v. Jaffree,'99 the Court considered for the first time the con-
stitutionality of a moment of silence statute. The law challenged in that
case authorized one minute of silence "[a]t the commencement of the first
class of each day in all grades in all public schools for meditation or vol-
untary prayer . . . " during which no other activities could be under-
taken by any student.2 00 Relying on abundant evidence in the record that
the purpose of the statute was to encourage praying in the public
schools, 20 1 the Court had little difficulty finding the statute unconstitu-
tional for lack of a secular purpose. 0
Because of the clear and unrebutted evidence of unconstitutional reli-
gious purpose that motivated passage of the Jaffree statute, that statute
was not a good test of the constitutionality of moment of silence laws in
general. Indeed, two members of the majority that held the Jaffree statute
unconstitutional allowed that moment of silence statutes whose text and
legislative history do not evidence an intent to favor prayer over other
activities are probably constitutional. 03 When added to the three Jaffree
dissenters who would have upheld that statute notwithstanding the evi-
dence of a constitutionally impermissible goal,204 these two make a major-
ity of the Court that apparently stands ready to uphold a properly drafted
and enacted moment of silence statute. Accordingly, the constitutionality
of these statutes is likely to remain a live issue before the Court in the
immediate future.
The dissenters in Jaffree criticized the majority's emphasis on evidence
of the unconstitutional religious motivations of the legislature, arguing
that the decision only encourages governmental decision-makers affirma-
tively to disguise (or at least be silent about) their true reasons for enact-
[hereinafter cited as Note, Moments of Silence in the Schools]; Note, Daily Moments of Silence in
Public Schools; A Constitutional Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 364, 407-08 (1983) (Appendix) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Daily Moments of Silence].
199. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
200. Id. at 2482 n.2.
201. The statutory language expressly named prayer as an approved activity during the silence
period, 105 S. Ct. 2481 at n.2; another state statute authorizing a moment of silence "for medita-
tion," but lacking any mention of voluntary prayer, had already been passed and was in force at the
time of enactment of the challenged statute, id., at 2481 n.l, 2491 n.45; the prime sponsor of the
statute in the legislature testified that the statute was an "effort to return voluntary prayer to [the]
public schools...," id. at 2490 & n.43; the state's pleadings at trial evidenced the same view of the
statutory purpose, id. at 2490 n.44; and the state failed to introduce any evidence at trial suggesting a
secular purpose for the statute, id. at 2491.
202. Id. at 2492 ("the State intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice").
203. Id. at 2493 & n.2 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2505 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 2505 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 2508 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
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ing a moment of silence statute.20 5 Careful scrutiny of the various secular
purposes advanced in support of moment of silence statutes suggests, how-
ever, that the statutes will usually be unconstitutional even when lacking
the damaging evidence of illicit purpose that was present in Jaffree, be-
cause a constitutionally impermissible purpose for the statutes can be in-
ferred from their impact.20 1
The most common (and plausible) of the secular purposes advanced for
moment of silence laws is that the silence period signals the beginning of
the school day and gives students the opportunity mentally to "shift
gears" and orient themselves to the business of learning. 201 If this is the
purpose of the laws, however, it is not clear why any students should be
excused from participating or why special permission should be necessary
to participate,2 0 8 nor is it apparent why the moment of silence is pre-
scribed only at the beginning of the school day and not after each recess
or change of classrooms.209 In fact, evidence of a disciplinary or educa-
tional purpose rarely is evident in the legislative history of moment of
silence laws.210
Opponents of the moment of silence laws contend that the true govern-
mental purpose behind the silence period is to create an "opportunity for
prayer" for public school students and subtly to endorse the practice of
praying during the opportunity.2 1' The legislative history 12 and the ineffi-
205. Id. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 2517 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
206. Thus, the argument implied by the dissent and often raised in criticism of motivation analy-
sis - that invalidation of laws on motive grounds is futile because the legislature can immediately
enact the same law with a more carefully written legislative history which will withstand constitu-
tional challenge - is inapplicable because the evidence of unconstitutional motive is not obtained
from legislative history but instead is inferred from the impact of the law. See Bice, supra note 76, at
692; supra text accompanying note 76.
207. See, e.g., May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1565, 1569 (D.N.J. 1983); Duffy v. Las Cruces
Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (D.N.M. 1983); Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337, 342
(D.Mass. 1976) (three-judge court) (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 281 n.57
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
208. These exemptions suggest that the moment of silence, even if it does not have a clearly
religious purpose, may entail effects thought by the state to be beyond the boundaries of what legiti-
mately may be imposed on a child in the name of public education. Cf. supra note 191.
209. See Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 103, 1017 (D.N.M. 1983); see also
May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1570 (D.N.J. 1983).
210. See, e.g., May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1564, 1565 (D.N.J. 1983); Duffy v. Las
Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013, 1015-16 (D.N.M. 1983). Indeed, the evidence generally is
to the contrary. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
211. E.g., Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161, 1163 (M.D.Tenn. 1982); Drakeman, supra note
173, at 357.
212. For example, many legislative sponsors unabashedly stated that their reason for introducing
or supporting the law was to allow public school students to pray in public schools, e.g., May v.
Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1564 (D.N.J. 1983); Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp.
1013, 1015, 1020 (D.N.M. 1983); Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161, 1464 (M.D. Tenn. 1982);
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cient way in which the moment of silence statutes as generally written
and administered implement the alleged educational goal, provide persua-
sive evidence of such a legislative motivation in most cases. Accordingly, a
frequent alternative justification for moment of silence laws is that the
silence period merely accommodates the free exercise rights of those stu-
dents who wish to pray at the beginning of each school day.2"3
In accommodating any religious practice, the government explicitly and
inescapably takes into account that practice in formulating the nature and
extent of its accommodating action. The result is that the action results in
a high level of government identification with the accommodated practice.
This identification is not constitutionally fatal under the secular purpose
prong, however, so long as the government credibly can show that it is
acting to accommodate the practices within the meaning of the free exer-
cise clause, and not to promote or endorse the practices."
The institution of a government-sanctioned opportunity for prayer
closely identifies the government with public school prayer."' Thus, the
extent to which opportunities for prayer can be provided to students
through less religious means-means that less visibly or directly involve
there generally was little or no discussion of the laws' supposed secular educational purposes during
the enactment process, e.g., May, 572 F. Supp. at 1564, 1565, Duffy, 557 F. Supp. at 1015-16; the
laws often were passed only after repeated attempts and in the face of serious questions regarding
their constitutionality, e.g., May, 572 F. Supp. at 1563; and the text of the laws was often explicitly
religious, e.g., Duffy, 557 F. Supp. at 1015; Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337, 341-42 (D.Mass.
1976) (three-judge court). See generally Note, supra note 198, at 1879-81; Drakeman, supra note
173, at 358, nn. 103 & 104. See also supra note 201.
213. E.g., Gaines v. Anderson, 521 F. Supp. 337, 342, 343 (D.Mass. 1976) (three-judge court);
see generally Dunsford, supra note 9, at 32-33, 43; Note, supra note 121, at 552-53 & nn. 183 &
184; Gaines, 421 F. Supp. at 344. Though it offered no evidence of secular purpose in the trial court,
the state in Ja~free used an accommodation argument on appeal to attempt to show a secular purpose.
See 105 S. Ct. at 2491 n.45. Some commentators have erroneously characterized religious accommo-
dation as a constitutionally impermissible purpose under the establishment clause. E.g., Note, Mo-
ments of Silence in the Schools, supra note 198, at 1885. However, that a purpose can be labeled
"religious" is not dispositive of the narrower secular purpose question - i.e., whether the state by the
moment of silence laws means disproportionately to aid or burden a religion or religion generally. See
supra text accompanying note 83. For example, laws that allow for excusal of employees from work
on religious holidays when practicable or that exempt Sabbatarians and other non-Sunday worship-
pers from compliance with Sunday closing laws have never been held to violate the establishment
clause. E.g., Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 9001 (Vernon 1985) (businesses may elect to close on
either Sunday or Saturday). The Court also has held that the release of public school students to
attend off-campus religious instruction classes during school hours is not a violation of the establish-
ment clause. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). But see McCollum v. Board. of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948). That such accommodation is not mandated by the free exercise clause does
not make it prohibited under the establishment clause. See supra notes 37 & 38 and accompanying
text.
214. See also supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
215. E.g., Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013, 1016, 1020 (D.N.M. 1983); see
Drakeman, supra note 173, at 358.
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the public school with student prayer-are relevant to whether the school
is accommodating prayer or promoting it.216 For example, if a student
wants to pray before school each day, he or she can surely do so at home
before leaving to come to school. If the student's religious devotion is such
that he or she feels the necessity to pray on school grounds immediately
prior to the commencement of the school day, it is not unreasonable to
expect that such a student can create the opportunity to pray on his or
her own. Even in the random morning confusion of the schoolyard, there
are likely to be time and place for a student to pause and invoke the
blessings of his or her particular deity. A student might pray silently im-
mediately prior to leaving his or her car or school bus, at the edge of the
schoolgrounds, in some relatively isolated or less trafficked part of the
campus, or at his or her desk immediately prior to the commencement of
class.217 Most moment of silence statutes, therefore, evidence an intention
that an opportunity for prayer be created (1) on the public school cam-
pus, (2) in a school-sanctioned, teacher-monitored classroom setting, and
(3) despite the absence of any meaningful impediment to voluntary
prayer on an individual basis.218 The state's insistence on "accommodat-
216. E.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123-24 & n.8 (1982); see Duffy v. Las
Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (D.N.M. 1983); Gardner, supra note 5, at 484-85;
Garvey, supra note 145, at 220-21; Lowey, School Prayer Neutrality and the Open Forum: Why We
Don't Need a Constitutional Amendment, 61 N.C. L. REV. 141, 156 (1982) ("it is difficult to justify
state-sanctioned prayer on free exercise principles when the same free exercise concerns can be ac-
commodated by a truly neutral method"). But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1363 n.7
(1984) (existence of less religious alternatives to challenged government action irrelevant under estab-
lishment clause). A heightened level of scrutiny also may be appropriate because prayer can be char-
acterized as a majoritarian religious practice that the government is accommodating. See Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (such actions are suspect); supra text accompanying notes 138-39;
cf Comment, A Non-Conflict Approach to the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 131 U. PA. L.
REv. 1175, 1178-79 (1983) (government efforts to remedy a burden it has placed on a minority
religion not viewed as having the purpose or effect of establishing religion).
217. Of course, to the extent that the student's beliefs require that certain worship forms be
observed such as vocalization, kneeling, use of rosary beads, or gesticulations, such locations may lack
the privacy. necessary for personally meaningful prayer. However, such privacy is not likely to exist
during a moment of silence in the classroom either. See Note, Moments of Silence in the Schools,
supra note 198, at 1886 n.76.
218. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2491 n.45 (1985) ("[t]here was no [state] practice
impeding students from silently praying for one minute at the beginning of each school day"); id. at
2505 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("No law prevents a student who is so inclined from praying silently
in public schools"); cf. Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161, 1163 (M.D.Tenn. 1982) ("Certainly a
statutory enactment is unnecessary to provide for a moment of silence").
The state might constitutionally accommodate student desire for a structured prayer opportunity by
allowing the organization of a student prayer group which would be permitted to use school facilities
on the same basis and at the same time periods as other school-affiliated clubs or organizations. See
Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965); supra note 153. Compare Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1980) (religious student groups permitted access to state university facilities
on same basis as nonreligious groups) and Lowey, supra note 192, at 143-49 (suggesting use of desig-
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ing" student desire to pray in school notwithstanding the absence of gov-
ernment impediments evidences a governmental purpose not merely to ac-
commodate those who desire to pray but to promote prayer by the use of
government influence. 219 In the absence of controverting evidence, the
laws should be found unconstitutional. Close scrutiny of the purported
secular purposes of moment of silence statutes, therefore, usually will lead
to their invalidation under the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test.
IV. SOME CLOSING OBSERVATIONS ON SECULAR PURPOSE
Although only two of the Court's establishment clause opinions ex-
pressly use motivation analysis in examining secular purpose under the
Lemon test, 220 numerous decisions have implicitly relied on both motiva-
tion and rationality analysis while engaging in meaningful scrutiny of the
purposes of governmental action that impacts establishment clause val-
ues."21 Most of these cases use the inquiry into governmental motivation
in a predictable manner. Evidence of governmental intent to promote or
to burden a particular religious belief or practice or religion generally
triggers close judicial scrutiny of articulated governmental goals and
shifts to the government the burden of proving that its purposes are secu-
lar. Evidence of secular governmental intentions may be either direct or
circumstantial. When the Court is convinced by evidence that the articu-
lated secular goals are not credible or that religious motivations played a
decisive role in the enacting process, the challenged action is struck down
under the establishment clause as lacking a constitutionally legitimate
purpose.
Several recent cases, however, suggest that the Court is dissatisfied
nated student classrooms for prayer is constitutionally permissible under First Amendment theories of
equal access to public forums and free marketplace of ideas) with Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984) (voluntary student prayer group meeting during high
school activity period constitutes violation of establishment clause), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1167
(1985) and Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123
(1981) (public school prayer meetings violate establishment clause). The relationship between the
establishment clause and more general First Amendment freedom of speech theories is beyond the
scope of this Article.
219. E.g., May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1564 (D.N.J. 1983); see Duffy v. Las Cruces
Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013, 1021 (D.N.M. 1983); Note, Daily Moments of Silence, supra note
198, at 405 (advocates of silent prayer confuse individual free exercise right to pray with establish-
ment clause prohibition of state sponsorship of prayer); Note, Moments of Silence in the Schools,
supra note 198, at 1881-82.
220. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
221. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1361 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 791-92 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-43
(1980); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-24 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 445-48 (1961).
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with the current state of secular purpose doctrine. Two of the Court's
recent establishment clause decisions do not rely on the Lemon test at all.
In Larson v. Valente,222 the Court held that government action that dis-
criminates among religious sects is inherently suspect and, therefore, calls
for classic strict scrutiny review.223 Application of the Lemon test was
confined in dicta to government action that discriminates between religion
and non-religion.22 4 In Marsh v. Chambers,226 the Court, without so much
as a citation to Lemon, used historical evidence of the past intentions of
the framers and the current intentions of the state to uphold the practice
of legislative prayer. 226
Strict scrutiny has been described as a proxy for exposing constitution-
ally illegitimate government goals. 2 17 Accordingly, the application of
strict scrutiny in Larson can be interpreted as simply a variant of the
more familiar inquiry into secular purpose under Lemon.228 Because strict
scrutiny analysis is highly inflexible, however, it will not prove to be a
useful tool for deciding establishment clause cases. Application of strict
scrutiny to a government action is tantamount to finding that the action is
unconstitutional; 29 thus, the crucial constitutional decision is the Court's
determination of the appropriate standard of review, rather than the ap-
plication of that standard.30 Yet Larson provides no principled basis by
which one can distinguish those factual situations that require strict scru-
tiny from those that may properly be analyzed under Lemon. By manipu-
lating the level of generality used to describe a religious belief or practice,
one can cast most government actions that implicate religion as either
discriminatory among religious sects or discriminatory between religion
and non-religion.23' Indeed, the city's display of the Christmas nativity
scene in Lynch v. Donnelly23 2 was characterized by the plaintiffs as a gov-
ernment preference of Christianity over Judaism and other religions that
do not accept the divinity of Jesus. 33 In contrast, the city argued that the
display merely constituted government recognition of the religious origins
222. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
223. Id. at 244-46.
224. Id.
225. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
226. Id. at 791-92.
227. E.g., J. ELY, supra note 70, at 125; Bennett, supra note 60, at 1077; Simon, supra note 62,
at 1069-70; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
228. See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 150, at 892-93 (reading Larson as a motive case).
229. See Gunther, supra note 65, at 8 (strict scrutiny is "strict in theory and fatal in fact").
230. See Bice, supra note 78, at 698.
231. See generally P. BoBBIrr, supra note 22, at 208-09.
232. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
233. Brief of Respondents at 38-39, Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
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of a widely observed secular holiday, thus redefining the action as one
that discriminates between religion and non-religion. 3" Because a major-
ity of the Court was of the view that the display was constitutionally per-
missible, it is not surprising that it declined to strictly scrutinize the city's
action. Nevertheless, the majority opinion in Lynch does not explain why
the action is not suspect as a government discrimination among sectarian
beliefs.
The historical analysis of Marsh is likewise of limited utility. Evidence
of the framers' intent with respect to the various provisions of the Consti-
tution is often ambiguous. Even when an original understanding can be
derived, its relevance to a contemporary constitutional controversy 200
years and several social revolutions later is not self-evident. 35 This is par-
ticularly true of the establishment clause. Though virtually all modern
establishment clause doctrine (not the least of which is the application of
the clause to the states) must be conceded to be far beyond the imagina-
tion of anyone who drafted the Constitution, it would seem to be a little
late in the day to overturn the body of establishment clause doctrine on
that basis alone. 6
Because Marsh was not decided under the Lemon test, the Court did
not pass on the legitimacy of the state's articulated secular purposes and,
indeed, it is not clear that any believable ones can even be imagined.2 37
Marsh can be fairly read, however, as substituting in place of the secular
purpose prong, a finding that the legislature genuinely did not intend to
establish or otherwise to promote a religion or religion generally, as evi-
denced by the historical record. 8 The remainder of the opinion makes
clear that the Court did not view as significant the alleged religious effects
234. Reply Brief of Petitioners at 3, Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
235. See J. ELY, supra note 70, at 11-42; Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
469, 476-500 (1981).
236. See Choper, supra note 9, at 676-77 (arguing framers could not have had any intent with
respect to religion in the public schools because public education was nonexistent at the time the First
Amendment was enacted); Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup. CT.
REv. 83, 86-87 (arguing language and history of religion clauses irrelevant to modern religious con-
troversies); Gangi, Book Review, 7 HARv. J.L. PuB. POL. 581, 594-96 (1984) (criticizing R. Cord.,
supra note 21, for failing to explain relevance to current law of framers' intentions regarding estab-
lishment clause); Tushnet, Book Review, 45 LA. L. REV. 175 (1984) (same). See generally supra note
21. Indeed, with the singular exception of Marsh, the Court has never upheld a governmental action
which implicates establishment clause values solely on the basis of historical evidence that the framers
did not view the challenged action as being unconstitutional.
237. See 463 U.S. at 797-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
238. See Bennett, supra note 65, at 1074; see also Dunsford, supra note 9, at I I ("Seized by the
conviction that legislative prayer is a violation of the establishment clause, the dissenters are blind to
the significance of the fact that those who wrote the clause and those who ratified it did not think
so").
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or potential entanglements posed by legislative prayer.23 9 Read this way,
Marsh is consistent with the view that government may legitimately take
certain actions in acknowledgment of widely-held religious beliefs so long
as it is not motivated by a desire disproportionately to aid or to burden
religion, and the action does not have that primary effect.
Marsh together with Lynch suggests that the Court may be willing to
tolerate a substantial coincidence of religious belief with government ac-
tion when inquiry into government purpose reveals no intent dispropor-
tionately to promote or to burden religion, even if the government is una-
ble to articulate a clear secular purpose. Thus, the first prong of the
Lemon test may be transformed in some cases from a government show-
ing of "legitimate secular purpose" into a showing of "no religious
purpose." 40
Under a justification model of the establishment clause, this is not a
significant doctrinal change. In most establishment clause challenges, the
government is at least able to articulate some marginally believable secu-
lar justification for the action under review. Introduction of evidence of
illicit religious motivation (if any) then shifts the burden back to the gov-
ernment to show that any such motivations were not significant causative
factors in the enactment process-a showing equivalent, if not identical,
to a showing that the desire disproportionately to aid or to burden religion
was not present in the decision to take the challenged action. When the
government cannot articulate any credible secular purposes, Marsh and
Lynch merely allow it to satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test by dis-
proving the existence of any illicit religious motive as a causative factor in
the enactment process.
The Court, however, may be moving away from the consistent and
meaningful scrutiny of governmental purpose that is implicit in a justifi-
239. 463 U.S. at 792-95.
240. Compare accompanying text with Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1368-69 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (appropriate inquiry under secular purpose prong is whether government
subjectively intended to endorse or disapprove religion) and Choper, supra note 9, at 675. ("The
Establishment Clause should forbid only governmental action whose purpose is solely religious and
that is likely to impair religious freedom by coercing, compromising or influencing religious beliefs").
To that extent, Lynch is consistent with McGowan, in which the Court's determination of the legiti-
macy of the state's articulated legislative goals enabled it to conclude that the legislation there in
question had a primary secular effect despite the substantial burdens imposed by the legislation on
non-Sunday worshippers. Marsh and Lynch suggest that a majority of the Court now is of the view
that when a governmental body can credibly articulate legitimate secular goals for challenged action
under the establishment clause (or can disprove any apparent impermissible goals), and the Court is
convinced that the accomplishment of such goals is in fact the primary motivation of the governmen-
tal body taking such action (or that apparent impermissible goals are in fact non-existent), the Court
will tolerate substantial advancements or inhibitions of religious belief or practice.
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cation model of the establishment clause. For example, in Mueller v. Al-
len,241 the Court appeared to read the secular purpose prong of the Lemon
test as requiring only a showing of facial neutrality in the text of a chal-
lenged statute." 2 Moreover, it denied the significance of statistical evi-
dence which overwhelmingly showed that the prime beneficiaries of the
statute were private religious schools, 48 while finding evidence of secular
purpose in various policy justifications imagined by the Court itself.2 4
Similarly, Justice O'Connor, despite the importance of purpose analysis to
her proposed refinement of the Lemon test, 4 5 apparently would require
only deferential judicial review of secular purpose."
If the Court consistently terminates scrutiny of government purpose in
establishment clause cases after a minimal showing of secular goals and
in the face of relevant evidence of illicit goals, it will run the serious risk
of validating governmental actions that have been motivated by a desire
disproportionately to aid or to burden a particular religion or religion gen-
erally. By cursory scrutiny of government purpose, the Court also deprives
itself of an opportunity to clarify the basis of decisions in factual situa-
tions in which the government takes constitutionally permissible action
that aids religion in some manner or otherwise closely identifies govern-
ment with religion. 41 Indeed, in failing to closely scrutinize government
motives in establishment clause cases, the Court ignores a powerful ana-
lytical tool whose consistent application would clarify the constitutionally
legitimate bounds of religious participation in government and govern-
ment regulation of religion.
241. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
242. Id. at 3069-70.
243. See id. at 3072-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 3066-67.
245. See supra note 150.
246. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (concurring opinion).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 151 & 182.
